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• Abstract
The understanding that others have beliefs or mental states different from our own is 
described as ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM). ToM deficits may explain some symptoms of 
schizophrenia'. However, there are few investigations o f the occurrence of ToM deficits in 
schizophrenia patients, and none in a forensic setting. There is also the question of ToM’s 
independence from other cognitive abilities.
This study compares ToM abilities in a sample of ‘treatment resistant’ patients diagnosed 
with schizophrenia (TRS) and patients diagnosed with a personality disorder (PD controls) 
resident in an English Special Hospital. Using a ToM task, no significant differences were 
found between groups in first order ToM (appreciation that another may have a false belief 
about the state of the world). However, the TRS sample were significantly more impaired in 
second order ToM (appreciation that another may have a false belief about the mental-state 
of another individual) than PD controls. Patients with predominantly behavioural signs 
symptoms performed significantly worse than other symptom groups.
Comparisons between second order ToM performance and functioning on conventional 
cognitive tasks suggested significant relationships between second order ToM and general 
intellectual functioning, and delayed recall o f prose and designs. Although no significant 
relationships were found between second order ToM and immediate recall o f prose and 
designs, organisation and planning, there was with the ability to shift thinking from one 
concept to another.
Following a summary o f the results, some methodological limitations o f the study are 
discussed, along with theoretical and clinical implications and possible future research.
VII
1. introduction
The folio wing study examines the performance of a ‘treatment resistant’ forensic 
sample o f patients with schizophrenia in a test of the ability to mentalize or represent 
the mental states o f others, i.e. to have a ‘theory of mind’. Its aim is to test the 
suggestion that this ability is impaired in specific symptom subgroups of 
schizophrenia, i.e. those with predominantly behavioural signs or paranoid delusions, 
compared to those with predominantly passivity phenomena symptoms. The 
relationship o f theory of mind ability to general intellectual functioning, memory, 
organisational and planning skills, and the ability to shift thinking from one concept 
to another is also examined.
In the following sections, the scene is set for the study’s rationale by providing a brief 
discussion of; the application o f a symptom approach to schizophrenia research; the 
cognitive deficits which are often present within schizophrenia; the recent distinction 
between non social and social cognition; the social deficits in schizophrenia; the 
theoretical basis o f studying theory of mind in schizophrenia and some studies in 
which this has been examined. The theory of mind ability of forensic patients is also 
discussed and why this may have particular consequences for the capacity to 
empathise. The final section describes how the present study will fit into the existing 
body o f research.
LI A Symptom Approach To Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is often clinically heterogeneous in the presentation o f  its symptoms 
and there have been several attempts to identify distinct types. However, these have 
only been partially successful. The classic subdivision put forward by Bleuler (1911),
of paranoid, hebephrenic, catatonic and simple schizophrenia has proved to be 
unsatisfactory as many patients exhibit characteristics o f more than one o f the 
subtypes. A similar problem has occurred within other classification systems. 
Combined, this problem suggests the heterogeneity of schizophrenia may be better 
described in terms o f syndromes which can coexist within a patient., ‘
The division of schizophrenia into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ symptoms is one attempt 
to describe identifiable syndromes. Crow (1980), suggests ‘type I ’ schizophrenia is 
characterised by positive symptoms and ‘type 2’ schizophrenia is characterised by 
negative symptoms, both reflecting independent dimensions o f psychopathology and 
not being mutually exclusive. The distinction between positive and negative 
symptoms may also overlap with the distinction between acute and chronic 
schizophrenia, with negative symptoms tending to be chronic and positive symptoms 
tending to be characteristic o f acute schizophrenic episodes. However, the overlap 
between problems when attempting to identify the pathological processes associated 
with a particular group of symptoms, may lead to the differences between acute and 
chronic pathological processes being confused with differences associated directly 
with symptom type.
Liddle (1987), attempted to overcome this problem. Using a factor analysis 
methodology o f examining Present State Examination scores (FSE, Wing, Cooper & 
Sartorius, 1974), Liddle found schizophrenia symptoms can be separated into three 
syndromes; psychomotor poverty (poverty of speech, lack o f spontaneous movement 
and various aspects o f blunting affect); disorganisation (inappropriate affect, poverty 
o f content o f speech and disturbances o f the form of thought); and reality distortion
(particularly types o f delusions and hallucinations). This division o f symptoms into 
three syndromes has subsequently been replicated with other patient populations with 
schizophrenia (e.g. Liddle & Barnes, 1990) and has been supported by 
neurophysiological investigations suggesting different patterns o f cerebral blood flow 
associated with the different syndroines (Liddle, Friston, Frith, Hirsch, Jones & 
Frackowiak, 1992). Since their introduction, Liddle’s syndrome clusters have become 
a widely accepted way o f classifying symptoms in schizophrenia research.
As individuals may have symptoms from more than one syndrome, syndromes may 
not represent distinct types of schizophrenia. Alternatively, they may reflect discrete 
pathological processes occurring within a single disease. This suggests a fundamental 
abnormality' in schizophrenia, which may be associated with One or more o f the three 
distinct pathological processes and whose presentation may be dependent upon an 
individual’s constitution and environment. It is likely that the supposed pathological 
processes responsible for the syndromes are either a cause or a consequence o f some 
fundamental abnormality. By examining schizophrenia in terms o f its symptoms, 
making predictions based upon the nature of these symptoms and devising tests which 
examine the cognitive function suspected of being deficient, there may be greater 
progress in understanding the disorder.
1.2 Cognitive Deficits In Schizophrenia
Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia are typically foimd to have impairments in a 
wide range o f cogmtive tasks. Such impairments include a general deterioration in 
mtcllectual functioning and loss of cognitive agility (e.g. Nelson, Fantelis, Camithers, 
Speller, Baxendale & Barnes, 1990; Dunkley & Rogers, 1994), problems in sustaining
attention and efficient information processing (Nelson et al, 1.990; Hemsley, 1994), 
difficulties in the organisation and planning o f responses (Shallice, Burgass & Frith, 
1991) and severe memory impairment (Tamlyn, McKenna, Mortimer, Lund, 
Hammond & Baddeley, 1992),
A number of studies have looked at the presence o f cognitive deficits in schizophrenia 
patients in a forensic context. Krakowski, Convit, Jaeger, Lin & Volavka (1989), in a 
study comparing high, low and no violence groups of in-patients with schizophrenia, 
found both neurological and neuropsychological abnormalities differentiated the 
groups. These abnormalities were especially significant among the high violence 
group, with integrative sensory and motor functions being the central areas o f 
impairment. In contrast, Lapierre, Braun, Hodgins, Toupin, Leveillee & Constanteau 
(1995), in a study of out-patient men who were assessed on various measures of 
lifelong history o f violence, psychopathology, neuropsychological performance and 
neuropsychological intactness, found few indicators of a positive relationship 
between neuropsychological performance and violent physical aggression. However, 
the authors highlight the heterogeneity o f their sample, such as the differing range of 
anti-social behaviours and levels of preserved functioning. Supporting the lack o f any 
association between cognitive impairment and the tendency towards violence. Barber
(1994), in an unpublished study comparing male Special Hospital patients with 
schizophrenia convicted o f homicide and a matched control group o f non homicidal 
patients with schizophrenia attending an out-patient clinic, found few performance 
differences between the two groups on a wide range o f different cognitive tasks 
specifically targeted at executive functioning. Interestingly, a small, but insignificant 
tendency was found for the Special Hospital patients to achieve slightly better results.
In a recent investigation o f Special Hospital patients with either schizophrenia or a 
personality disorder. Hill, Chesterman, Lumsden, Tidmarsh & Murphy (1997), found, 
although there were minimal differences between patient groups in terms o f probable 
cerebral pathology, there were finer distinctions in the patterns o f relative strengtl^s 
and weaknesses in cognitive abilities. The most impaired abilities among patients 
with schizophrenia were those related to speed of information processing and to more 
general cognitive flexibility. However, variable levels o f impairment were found in 
patients with schizophrenia, suggesting a detailed investigation of individual 
symptom presentations might be more informative. Overall, there appears to be some 
degree o f inconsistency in findings across studies regarding the relationship between 
neuropsychological performance and history of violence. It also highlights the need 
for continued investigation of the complex relationship which appears to exist 
between history o f offending, cognitive impairment and behavioural disturbance.
1.3 Non Social & Social Cognition
The distinction between non social and social cognition is beginning to gain support 
(Penn, Corrigan, Bentall, Racenstein & Newman, 1997). Social cognition has been 
defined as that domain which involves the perception, interpretation and processing 
o f social information (Ostrom, 1984). ‘Social’ in this context is taken to mean how 
we think about ourselves, other people and the interactions between them.
Although the presence o f non social cognition deficits in schizophrenia appear well 
established, there are limitations as to how much these account for the large variance 
in social competence and functioning found among individuals with schizophrenia. 
Such non social cognitive deficit explanations also tend to omit the social context in
which cognitive functioning often take place. Furthermore, they fail to apply the same 
explanations to the social cognitive processes which may take place in non patient 
samples. The importance o f social cognition is highlighted by premorbid social 
competence, which in some studies has been found to be the strongest predictor of 
outcome in patients with schizophrenia (e.g. Mueser, Bellack, Morrison & Wixted, 
1990). Furthermore, social competence at discharge has been found to be inversely 
related to relapse rate (Johnstone, MacMillan, Frith, Benn & Crow, 1990). However, 
the relationship between non social and social cognition remains to be clearly 
established, particularly whether they represent different levels of cognitive analysis 
on the same continuum or are distinct entities.
1.4 Social Deficits In Schizophrenia
Impairments in social functioning are among the hallmarks o f schizophrenia (DSM- 
IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). It is thought that a study of social 
cognition in schizophrenia may augment understanding o f the clinical and 
behavioural manifestations o f the disorder (Penn et al., 1997). The rationale for this 
comes from the view that schizophrenia is an interpersonal disorder in which 
problems result from faulty constructions o f the social environment and one’s place in 
it.
An early investigation o f the social deficits in schizophrenia is provided by Diamond 
(1956), using a version of the autokinetic experiment to compare the performance of 
individuals with schizophrenia with the performance o f emotionally disturbed 
individuals without schizophrenia. It was found that individuals with schizophrenia 
were unable to modify their responses to be consistent with the responses o f another
person in an interpersonal situation. This was argued to support the notion that 
individuals with schizophrenia do not adequately internalise the views of another. 
More recently, a similar suggestion has been put forward by Good (1990), who 
examined the problems which arise in conversations where a speaker is required to 
supply detailed information to a listener in order to be understood. After observing 
individuals with schizophrenia, it was suggested they typically failed to recognise that 
another individual needed more information than was actually given in order to 
understand what was being said.
An investigation o f non-verbal social deficits is provided by LaRusso (1978), who 
examined the sensitivity of paranoid patients to non-verbal cues, using video tapes 
showing people expecting to receive electric shocks or people simulating^ the same 
expectation. After asking subjects to say whether the people were expecting electric 
shocks or were pretending; the results suggest that while paranoid patients were more 
accurate in their decision about the genuine stimuli, normal controls were more 
accurate in their decisions concerning the simulated stimuli. LaRusso argues this 
finding is due to the paranoid patients being more sensitive to the genuine stimuli 
because o f a processing bias and that the controls were more sensitive to simulated 
stimuli because they were more accepting of stereotypical social presentations.
Another example of the social difficulties experienced by individuals with 
schizophrenia is provided by Cutting & Murphy (1990), who compared patients with 
schizophrenia, manic psychosis and depression in ability to appreciate social 
knowledge. Using two sets o f multiple choice questions (one testing the knowledge of 
how people tend to act in social situations and the other testing knowledge o f non
social events or objects), it was found that individuals with schizophrenia performed 
poorly in the first questions compared to the other two groups. Cutting and Murphy 
suggest this reflects a social naivete o f individuals with schizophrenia. Two possible 
explanations for this were put forward, either that patients perform the task poorly 
because o f limited experience and exposure to such situations, or that poor social 
judgements are an intrinsic feature of schizophrenia or at least o f a subgroup o f these 
patients.
Following these findings, two broad social cognitive models o f schizophrenia 
symptomatology have been put forward. Both argue that attempts should be made to 
identify social cognitive abnormalities associated with particular symptom classes, on 
the assumption that the diverse range of symptoms exhibited by patients with 
schizophrenia are unlikely to be explicable in terms of common non social cognitive 
abnormalities The first by Bentall (1990, 1994), suggests that the symptoms of 
hallucinations and delusions can be explained by a misattribution o f their perception 
to an external source. The second by Frith (1992, 1994), suggests that schizophrenic 
symptoms can be explained by a general impairment in ‘theory o f mind’, i.e. the 
ability to represent the mental states o f others. i
V .
1.5 Theory Of Mind fToMl
First introduced by Premack & Woodruff (1978), ToM was used to describe an 
apparent deception behaviour in chimpanzees. Premack & W oodruff defined ToM as 
the ability to impute mental states to oneself and others. Extending this, it is thought 
human communication is based upon the assumption that others have minds just like 
ours and that it is necessary to have a ToM if we are to base our behaviour on what is
known about the beliefs and intentions o f others (Frith, 1994). The evolutionary 
importance o f ToM has been highlighted by Baron-Cohen (1996), who suggests the 
ability to mentalize has developed through natural selection o f  an ability which is 
advantageous within a social context.
A clue to the nature o f this ToM mechanism is provided by early childhood autism. 
As a disorder, autism is thought to be characterised by a triad o f impairments, 
including autistic aloneness, poor communication and lack o f pretend play (Wing & 
Gould, 1979). It has been proposed that these impairments are due to a faulty ToM 
mechanism. As many individuals with autism have IQs within normal limits, it has 
been suggested their social impairments must be due to a deficit which is IQ 
independent (Frith, 1989). Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985), suggest this deficit 
might be linked to problems in metarepresentational development. Using a model 
developed by Leslie (1987), they argue this mechanism is a crucial aspect of social 
skills, i.e. being able to conceive mental states and knowing that other people know, 
want, feel or believe in things - that is, having a ToM  It is thought that a ToM is also 
dependent upon having ‘second order representation’, i.e. the ability to appreciate that 
others have mental states which may be different from our own.
Comparing children with autism (with relatively high IQ’s), with Down’s syndrome 
and normal pre-schoolers, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) found 80% o f the children with 
autism performed poorly in a task designed to test whether they possess second order 
representation (Wimmer & Pemer’s, 1983, deception task and the Sally Ann Dolls 
lest). From these findings, they suggest autistic children as a group fail to employ a
ToM, or more specifically have an inability to represent mental states. They suggest 
children with autism are unable to impute beliefs onto others.
Although autism and schizophrenia have traditionally been classified separately for 
diagnostic purposes, with fhe presence o f positive symptoms ruling out the diagnosis 
o f autism (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994), historically the term 
‘Autism’ coined by Bleuler (1911) was used to describe a feature o f schizophrenia. 
For example, paralleling autistic aloneness, communication difficulties and lack o f 
pretend play, individuals with schizophrenia show social withdrawal, poverty o f 
speech and stereotyped rather than spontaneous behaviour. In addition, the language 
difficulties found in both groups tend to involve pragmatics rather than syntax or 
semantics (Frith & Allen, 1988). In terms of cognitive test performances, similarities 
have been found in poor performance in ‘frontal’ tests rather than those localised to 
other brain sites (Shallice, Burgess & Frith, 1991).
Frith & Frith (1991) argue that the differences between autism and schizophrenia 
might be analogous to differences between early and late onset disorders. 
Consequently any similar underlying cognitive deficit which may manifest itself in 
different ways, would be consistent with different aetiologies in the two groups (Frith, 
1994). A more direct relationship is suggested by Murray & Lewis (1992), who put 
forward a ‘neurodevelopmental’ subgroup o f schizophrenia. This subgroup may have 
an early onset, together with a high proportion o f males and defects in IQ, behaviour 
and sociability that can be traced back to early childhood. Supporting this, several 
case studies suggest some children with an initial diagnosis o f infantile autism go on 
to develop adult schizophrenia (Petty, Omitz, Michelman & Zimmerman, 1984).
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1.6 ToM & Schizophrenia
Frith (1992, 1994), suggests that the positive symptoms o f schizophrenia such as 
hallucinations and delusions, are due to impairments in the ability to represent mental 
states. Frith argues that two discrete deficits relate to the nature o f the delusion or 
hallucination expressed. Symptoms such as thought insertion and delusion o f control 
(i.e. passivity phenomena) reflect impairments in the abilit>' o f an individual to 
represent their intentions to act (Frith & Done, 1989), whilst symptoms such as 
delusions o f reference and persecution may reflect a difficulty in representing the 
mental states of other people, i.e. a deficit in the ability to mentalize or to have a ToM 
(Frith, 1994).
Frith suggests that a number of studies not explicitly couched in ToM terms, but 
which are dependant upon the mechanism support the ToM deficit account of 
schizophrenia symptoms. For example, Pilowsky & Bassett (1980), in a study of the 
way patients with schizophrenia describe pictures of other people, found that in 
contrast to controls without schizophrenia, they were more likely to use physical 
rather than mental state descriptions. Allen (1984), carried out a similar study in 
which patients with schizophrenia were asked to describe pictures o f people. It was 
found that patients with poverty of speech failed to make inferences about these 
pictures, particularly in relation to the mental states of the people shown.
By definition, certain delusions may involve false inferences about the intentions of 
other people (Frith, 1994). Individuals with delusions of persecution infer that others 
have evil intentions towards them, whilst individuals with delusions o f reference 
falsely infer that others are communicating with them. In addition, there are more
n
subtle consequences o f having difficulties in inferring the mental states o f others. 
Frith describes the situation where, under normal conditions, we have an immediate 
feeling o f contact with others and that it is not particularly difficult to find out what is 
in their minds by a matter of direct perception. However, the question arises as to how 
one would behave when this ability to read others is absent? Within autism, this lack 
o f the ability to read others is sometimes referred to as ‘mind blindness’ (Frith & 
Frith, 1991). Within the context of schizophrenia, this absence may be the basis of 
particular symptoms. Others may be seen as wooden and without real emotions (i.e. 
derealisation), or in extreme cases loved ones may be viewed as no longer having any 
real mental states, as though they had been replaced by robots (i.e. Capgras 
syndrome). Further, it could be that we can no longer read our own mental states and 
feel ourselves to be unreal (i.e. depersonalisation). Taking this further, if  it is difficult 
to read other’s intentions, we might believe that this was a deliberate ploy and that 
others were deliberately disguising their real intentions in order to gain some 
unknown advantage. This could be the basis for a paranoid belief in a general 
conspiracy and might particularly apply to those we knew well, as we would have 
gained some facility in reading their intentions.
Frith suggests a more severe consequence of a ToM deficit is a failure of 
‘decoupling’. This is the mechanism which allows an individual to represent 
propositions (e.g. “that Emma believes that ‘it is snowing”’). Following Leslie’s 
(1987), idea that a main requirement of such representations is a mechanism that 
decouples the content o f the proposition (it is snowing) from reality. Frith argues that 
decouplmg is a critical feature o f such propositions because they are neither true or 
false and, therefore, fundamentally different from representations o f reality. When a
12
decoupling process fails. Frith suggests the content o f the proposition (such as it is 
snowing) becomes separated from the rest o f the proposition (such as Emma believes 
th a t....) and that the content is then perceived as a representation o f reality rather than 
another’s belief. Consequently, as reality and beliefs do not always coincide, this 
could potentially be very confusing, resulting in ‘free floating’ representations. Frith 
suggests this may explain the cause o f third person hallucinations in schizophrenia, 
with the precise nature of the experience being determined by the proposition from 
which it became detached.
In addition to free floating representations. Frith suggests that a failure in the 
decoupling mechanism will lead to an inability to represent either their own or 
another’s mental state. Within this context. Frith (1987) argues that patients with 
passivity experiences (e.g. with delusions o f control and thought insertion) have a 
defect in central monitoring, This central monitoring is thought to he dependent on 
being aware of an intention to make a particular response before it is actually made. 
Without central monitoring, responses and intentions will be assessed by peripheral 
feedback. Frith gives the example that if  we were unable to monitor our own 
intentions with regard to speech, we would not know what we were going to say until 
after we had said it. Frith (1994) argues that this failure in central monitoring is due to 
an inability to monitor one’s own mental states and intentions. However, this lost 
ability to represent mental states, and associated loss of awareness, is not an ‘all or 
nothing’ process, but may be based upon a continuum o f difficulty underlying the 
representations. Frith suggests that this continuum can be observed in studies which 
have examined the development of the ability to represent mental states in children. 
Specifically, Frith suggests that the development o f a ‘representational mind’ is
13
closely related to the development o f an awareness of mental states. The development 
o f the awareness o f our own mental states and those o f others may therefore depend 
on our ability to represent these states.
After reviewing the developmental literature, Frith suggests that progress towards a 
ToM can be associated with three distinct stages, which are an awareness o f our goals 
an awareness o f our own intentions and of other mental states, and an awareness of 
other people’s mental states. These stages are associated with different classes of 
schizophrenic signs and symptoms as seen in Table 1.
Table 1. Abnormalities O f Awareness At Various Levels And Some Associated 
Signs And Symptoms O f Schizophrenia (Taken From Frith , 1994, p.156)
Loss o f Awareness Of..... Positive Features Negative Features
Own Goals Grandiose Ability Depersonalisation, Lack 
O f Will
Own Intentions Delusions O f Control, 
Thought Insertion
Poverty O f Thought, Loss 
O f Affect
Other’s Intentions Delusions O f Persecution, 
Third Person Hallucination
De-realisation, Social 
Withdrawal
1.7 Studies O f ToM Schizophrenia
Although the social deficits o f individuals with schizophrenia are interpreted as being 
consistent with the concept o f a ToM deficit account, to date there have only been 
two published investigations directly assessing ToM in schizophrenia.
The first investigation, by Corcoran, Mercer & Frith (1995), devised a simple social 
inference task to examine an individual’s ability to comprehend indirect speech. This 
involved giving a ‘hinting task’ to assess an individual’s ability to infer the real
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intentions behind indirect speech. It comprised ten short passages presenting an 
interaction between two characters and all ending with a character dropping a very 
obvious hint. After each story, the question asked was, what did the character really
mean after saying ? All stories were read aloud to individuals so that appropriate
prosodic information was included. Given the problems in prose recall typically found 
in schizophrenia (e.g. Shallice, Burgess & Frith, 1991), stories were repeated to those 
individuals who wished so.
Comparing six groups o f in-patients with schizophrenia (those with either negative 
features, incoherence, paranoid symptoms, or passivity experiences; those with other 
symptoms such as expansive and musical hallucinations; and those in remission), 
with control subjects (other psychiatriç and ‘normal’ individuals), it was found that 
specific symptom subgroups of schizophrenia perfonned poorly in the hinting task 
compared to controls. Consistent with Frith’s (1992) model, a hierarchy o f expressed 
severity appeared to be present, with problems in the hinting task being present in 
patients with negative symptoms and related positive features (including incoherent 
speech). Patients with passivity experiences and those in remission showed no 
problems in the hinting task. This is interpreted by Corcoran et al. (1995) as support 
for the argument that there are symptom specific difficulties in the ability to infer 
what is going on in the minds o f other people. Because those patients with passivity 
experiences were able to solve the hinting task it suggests the ability to monitor their 
own intentions to act and the ability to monitor those of others are independent of 
each other. Furthermore, as those patients in remission solved the hinting task it 
suggests the ability to mentalize may be a state rather than a trait variable and is 
closely associated, to symptomatology.
ïn terms of overall group differences, a greater level o f impairment was found in 
those individuals with schizophrenia compared to controls. However, a problem with 
this finding is that the two groups were not matched in their current level of 
intellectual functioning. Corcoran et al. (1995) suggest this is not likely to be 
important as any IQ difference could not account for the difference in the 
performance of the hinting task. Although they do not explicitly describe how, 
Corcoran et al. suggest that the two groups are performing the task differently. They 
highlight the correlation between performances in the hinting task and estimated IQ in 
the respective groups. Within the control group the correlation between estimated IQ 
and hinting task performance is zero, and the same was true with individuals with 
schizophrenia. They suggest that this implies individuals with schizophrenia may rely 
on a generalised intellectual ability independent of IQ.
The second study investigating ToM in schizophrenia was conducted by Frith & 
Corcoran (1996). Using a ToM task consisting of six short stories, the mentalizing 
ability of four subgroups o f individuals with schizophrenia (those with either 
behavioural signs, paranoid symptoms, passivity phenomena or in remission) were 
compared with a group of non symptomatic controls. Based upon those developed by 
Happé (1994), the stories examine the ability o f individuals to appreciate first and 
second order false belief and deception. In a first order story, one character has a false 
belief about the state of the world, whilst in a second order story, one character has a 
false belief about the belief o f another character. Following each story, participants 
were asked two questions. The first was dependent upon the ability o f the participant 
to infer the mental state o f one o f the characters in the story (i.e. a ToM  question) and 
reflected that character’s false belief about the situation. The second was targeted at
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the participant’s comprehension of the story and understanding o f the reality o f the 
situation. This question could be answered independently o f any mentalizing abilities 
and provided a measure o f how well participants had remembered each story.
Results suggested that patients with paranoid delusions and behavioural signs, 
compared to the other groups, had difficulty in solving the ToM questions for both 
first and second order stories. This.confirms the results obtained by Corcoran et al.
(1995). In addition, the result is likely to be independent o f any general cognitive 
disability as there was no significant difference in IQ between the patients with 
paranoid delusions, symptoms o f passivity or those in remission. There was also 
nothing to suggest that IQ influenced the performance of the control group.
However, in terms of the relationship with memory, the interpretation of these 
findings is not clear. As patients with paranoid delusions and behavioural signs also 
had problems in the reality questions, their ToM performance is difficult to make 
sense of. This means that the direction of causality' is uncertain, as the problem with 
mentalizing may cause the memory problem or vice versa. For example, it may be 
that the stories used (particularly second order) may present some patients with too 
great a memory load.
Frith & Corcoran suggest that it is interesting that the patients with passivity 
symptoms (delusions o f control and thought insertion, etc.) could answer the ToM 
questions. This is consistent with the results obtained by Corcoran et al. (1995), 
however, Mlakar, Jensterle & Frith (1994) found that patients with passivity 
experiences typically have problems with representing their own mental states. This
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suggests that the problem with representing their own mental states may not 
generalise to inferring the mental states of others. In terms o f the patients in 
remission, because they also answered both the reality and ToM questions without 
any problems, it suggests that the underlying cognitive deficit may fluctuate with 
symptoms and therefore is a state rather than a trait variable.
In tenus of the relationship with other cognitive skills. Frith & Corcoran suggest that 
the ToM deficit, although remaining to be confirmed as independent, is likely to be 
distinct from other cognitive difficulties. To date, the relationship between ToM and 
other cognitive skills, such as more specific measures of memoiy and executive 
functioning, remain to be clearly established. This would appear to be particularly 
important given the well established problems in general intellectual functioning, 
memory, organisation and planning present among the symptom subgroups of 
schizophrenia.
1.8 ToM In Forensic Patients
The presence of a ToM deficit may be particularly important in forensic patients. It is 
suggested that the ability to empathise with another is dependent on the ability to 
represent their mental states (Frith, 1989). Indeed, representations o f the internal 
world o f another may act as stimuli for the activation of an affective empathie 
response (Bateson, Fultz & Schoenrade, 1987). A ToM deficit may therefore lead to a 
lack o f empathy
Several clinical descriptions suggest that individuals with psychopathy lack the ability 
to empathise with another’s distress (e.g. Hare, 1991). Although there is no consensus
of findings, this clinical description is supported by studies demonstrating that 
psychopaths fail to produce any physiological or affective responses to either actors 
modelling distress reactions or to pictures o f individuals in distress (e.g. Aniskiewicz, 
1979).
A recent empirical investigation of ToM in psychopathy is provided by Blair, Sellars, 
Strickland, Clark, Williams, Smith & Jones (1996). Using Happé’s (1994) advanced 
test o f ToM, a comparison was made between male Special Hospital patients rated as 
having psychopathic personality disorder and incarcerated non psychopathic controls 
defined using a Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R, Hare, 1991). No significant 
differences in ToM were found between the groups and it was suggested that the 
psychopath’s deficit in their ability to empathise is not likely to be due to a ToM 
deficit.
To date, there has not been any investigation o f ToM in a forensic sample of 
individuals with schizophrenia. This would appear to be particularly important as they 
represent a significant proportion o f forensic patients (Modestin & Ammann, 1996). 
Among violent and psychotic men, there is also evidence to suggest that delusions 
and, in particular, delusions of a paranoid nature, are common précipitants for 
offending (Taylor, 1985). If Frith’s account o f a ToM deficit being present in 
particular symptom subgroups o f schizophrenia is correct, it may have important 
implications for understanding and treating this patient group. This question is 
highlighted furtlier by the inconsistency o f findings regarding the relationship 
between cogmtive performance and history o f violence in schizophrenia. Because a 
ToM deficit has been found within a non forensic sample o f patients with
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schizophrenia, it would be interesting to examine if  similar deficits are present within 
a forensic sample.
1.9 Present Study & Hypotheses
Frith’s account o f ToM deficits in particular symptom subgroups o f schizophrenia 
represents a new and exciting area o f investigation. However, given its relabvely new 
formulation as a theory and that there have been only two direct empirical 
investigations, there remain several unanswered questions. These include whether the 
initial findings can be replicated in other populations o f individuals with 
schizophrenia and the relationship o f ToM with other ‘non social’ dimensions o f 
cognition. As suggested, the presence of a ToM deficit in patients with schizophrenia 
may be particularly important within a forensic context, with the ability to empathise 
with another being dependent on the ability to represent their mental state (i.e. having 
a ToM). The potential to understand offending behaviour and develop new  
interventions may also arise.
The aim o f the current investigation is to more closely examine within a forensic 
context (i.e. a Special Hospital), Frith’s account o f ToM deficit in schizophrenia. 
Using a similar methodology to that employed by Frith & Corcoran (1996), patients 
with schizophrenia will be subdivided according to their symptom profile. Different 
symptom profiles will then be compared with each other and a personality disorder 
control group
The experimental group selected includes patients with a DSM - IV (1994) diagnosis 
o f schizophrenia and who can be divided into one o f three groups. These groupings
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are o f those with either predominantly behavioural signs, passivity phenomena or 
paranoid delusions as their main symptoms. No ‘in remission’ patients were included 
in the investigation, as such individuals would no longer be detained in a Special 
Hospital. All patients have also been previously classified as ‘treatment resistant’ 
(TRS), rneaning that they have been unresponsive to neuroleptic medication. It is 
hypothesised that these patients represent an important population to examine, if  the 
ToM deficit account o f schizophrenia is correct. The control group selected 
represents another forensic patient population with a DSM - IV (1994) diagnosis of 
personality disorder (PD). The rationale for selecting this group was guided by the 
findings o f the previously described investigation by Blair et al. (1996) which 
suggested that a ToM deficit is not present in this patient population.
In addition to the between group comparison of patients, a within group comparison 
will be made o f the relationship between an individual’s ToM performance and 
previously obtained profiles o f neuropsychological test scores. These include 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised (WAIS-R), Wechsler Memory Scale - 
Revised (WMS-R) scores and tasks designed to examine perceptual organisation, 
planning and visual memory, and capacity to sort and shift concepts. These include 
the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test (CFT) and Classical Weigl, respectively. 
Recently, such tasks have been thought to be associated with higher executive 
functioning and predominantly located within the frontal lobes (e.g. Lezak, 1995). As 
highlighted, the relationship between ToM, general intellectual functioning, memory, 
organisation and concept formation skills remains to be fully examined.
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To.summarise, the aims of the investigation will be:
1. To examine the ToM performance o f a forensic sample o f patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (and classified as ‘treatment resistant’) subdivided into one o f three 
symptom groups o f either predominantly behavioural signs, passivity phenomena 
or paranoid delusions and to compare them with each other and a Personality 
.Disorder control group.
Hypothesis (IH ,) - That patients with schizophrenia will perform significantly less 
well than the PD control group in the ToM task (both first order, i.e. the ability to 
appreciate that others may have a false belief about the state o f the world, and second 
order, i.e. the ability to appreciate that another may have a false belief about the 
mental state of another) and that those patients with either predominantly paranoid 
delusions or behavioural signs will be more impaired than those with predominantly 
passivity symptoms.
Null Hypothesis (IHo) - That patients with schizophrenia will not perform 
significantly differently from the PD control group in the ToM task (both first and 
second order) and that the three symptom subgroups of schizophrenia will not differ 
in ToM performance.
.2. To compare performance on the ToM task with performances on a range of 
neuropsychological tests, including WAJS-R, WMS-R, Rey-Osterrieth CFT and 
Classical Weigl.
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Hypothesis (2H%) - That performance in the ToM task will be unrelated to or 
independent o f performance in any of the neuropsychological tests.
Null Hypothesis (2Hg) - That perfon?jance in the ToM task will be related to 
performance in either one of the neuropsychological tests.
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2. Method
2.1 Design
In the first part o f the study, an independent groups design is used to compare the 
performance of a forensic. Treatment Resistant’ Schizophrenia (TRS) sample and a 
Personality Disorder (PD) control group in a test o f ToM .
The independent variables are the respective groups including the PD controls and TRS 
sample. The TRS sample is sub-divided into those with either predominantly behavioural 
signs, passivity phenomena or paranoid delusions as their main symptoms.
The dependent variables include the performance in a test of ToM.
In the second part of the study, a within groups design is used to compare the total group’s 
ToM. test performance and their performance in neuropsychological tests including the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R), Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised 
(WMS-R), the Rey-Osterreith Complex Figure Test (CFT) and Classical Weigl.
2.2 Participants
In total 60 participants took part in the study. As a forensic sample, at the time o f testing all 
participants were patients in one of England’s three Special Hospitals and detained under 
sections 37 / 41 ' o f the Mental Health Act (1983). Only male patients were selected and those 
with English as a first language.
' 37  P ow er to  make a hospital or guardianship order, 41 Restriction order.
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i. T rea tm e n t Resistant Schizophrenia' Sample (TRS)
37 patients (61.6% o f total) meeting the criteria for a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for 
Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, (DSM-TV 1994) diagnosis of 
schizophrenia took part used in the study. These patients were selected from an ongoing 
research programme o f ‘Treatment Resistant Schizophrenia’ within the hospital. They have, 
to date, been unresponsive to any neuroleptic medication and have been detained for a 
number o f years. Using a Symptom Rating Checklist described later, these patients were 
assigned into one o f three groups, those with either predominantly behavioural signs (N= 12 - 
20%), passivity phenomena (N= 11 -18.3% ) or paranoid delusions (N= 14 - 23.3%).
ii. Personality Disorder Controls (PD)
23 (38.3% o f total) PD patients within the hospital were used as controls. They all had a 
DSM-IV (1994) diagnosis o f psychopathic personality disorder and no history of a psychotic 
illness.
2.3 M easures
i. ToM  Task
Six stories were used to assess ToM. Developed and used by Frith & Corcoran (1996), these 
provide a brief examination of an individual’s ability to appreciate first and second order 
false belief and deception. In the first order stories a character has a false belief about the 
state o f the world. In the second order stories a character has a false belief about the belief o f 
another character Roth sets o f stories describe naturalistic social situations and require either 
the interpretation o f a story character’s behaviour, i.e. what they have said or a prediction o f 
how they would act. The stories are presented in Appendix i.
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After each story was read out to the participant, two questions were asked. These are also 
presented in Appendix i. The first question was aimed at the individual’s understanding of 
the mental state o f a  central character in the story, i.e. the ToM question. The second 
question was targeted at the individual’s comprehension of the story. Based on the reality of 
the situation, this question could be answered without any mentalizing abilities. As such, this 
question also served as a measure of how well the individual had remembered the story.
The scoring procedure for both questions followed that described by Frith & Cocoran (1996). 
For the first and second order ToM and memory questions, the participant was given either a 
pass or a fail. The criteria for a correct answer in the ToM question is based upon the content 
of the response, i.e. an ability to appreciate the mental state of one o f the characters in the 
story and that character’s false belief about the situation. The criteria for a correct answer in 
the reality / memory question is based on the correct recall o f a  ta r g e t  piece of information 
from the story.
Percentage o f correctly answered questions was calculated separately for first order ToM and 
for associated memory questions and for second order ToM and associated memory 
questions.
ii. Symptom Rating Checklist (SRC)
The construction, administration and scoring o f this measure was carried out in co-operation 
with a senior research psychiatrist on the TRS project. As a custom made measure it was 
intended to provide a  brief assessment o f the presence o f behavioural signs, passivity 
phenomena and paranoid delusions in schizophrenia. It consists o f a total o f  15 items and
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three sections designed to match the symptom subgroups used in the current study. The 
individual items are taken from: The Scale for the Assessment o f Negative Symptoms 
(SANS: Andreason, 1989); The Comprehensive Psychiatric Rating Scale (GPRS: Asberg, 
Perris, Schalling & Sedvall, 1978); and The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS: Overall & 
Gorham, 1962). The completed measure is presented in Appendix ii.
Items within the measure required scores based on observation and on direct questioning by 
the interviewer. An individual’s final score on the measure was calculated by converting their 
total score in each o f the three symptom subgroup sections of the SRC to three respective 
percentage scores. An individual was assigned to a symptom subgroup based on the highest 
score in each o f the three symptom subgroups. The criteria for each symptom subgroup is 
given in the SRC.
In order to establish the inter-rater reliability^ of the measure, twelve interviews were 
conducted with another independent rater present who had been trained in the administration 
and scoring o f the measure. Data presented in the Results section suggest the SRC has an 
acceptable level o f inter-rater reliability.
iii. Neuropsychological Tests
Each participant had previously completed a battery of conventional psychometric tests. 
These had been administered by a member o f the permanent hospital clinical staff over the 
preceding one and a half years. A selection o f tests were used in the present analysis 
including, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R), the Wechsler Memory 
Scale - Revised (WMS-R), the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test (CFT) and the Classical 
Weigl.
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VVAIS-R Full Scale IQ - (Wechsler, 1986)
This was calculated from the sum of all the individual subtest scaled scores (or their prorated 
values if  fewer than the eleven subtests were administered) and following the directions 
outlined in the manual (Wechsler, 1986). Although there is scepticism regarding the 
usefulness o f averaging the performance o f the subtests (e.g. Kaufman, 1990), the full scale 
IQ is thought to represent a general measure of intellectual functioning with age related 
norms. It has also been found to be an excellent predictor o f academic achievement (Lezak, 
1988). The validity and reliability of the test has been well established and described in texts 
such as Lezak (p. 699,1995).
WMS-R - (Wechsler, 1988)
Four o f the nine Wechsler memory subtests were included in the current analysis. These 
were, immediate memory for a complex story, delayed recall o f the same story, immediate 
memory o f four geometrical designs and delayed recall o f the same designs. The 
administration and scoring o f the test was carried out following the instructions outlined in 
the manual (Wechsler, 1988). The overall test has well established reliability and validity and 
is described in texts such as Lezak (1995).
CFT - (Rey, 1941, Osterrieth, 1944)
This is a test which allows the assessment of a variety o f cognitive processes, including 
planning, organisational skills and problem solving strategies, as well as perceptual, motor 
and memory functions. Overall, the test has well established validity and reliability, which 
has been well described in texts such as that by Lezak (1995). The test’s procedure involves 
having the subject first copy the figure using coloured pencils on blank pieces o f paper and 
then, without warning, being asked to reproduce it after a time delay (here approximately 30
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minutes).. This produces a copy and recall sequence score. Both are scored in the same 
manner, so the degree of organisation can be compared in each. The scoring criteria for both 
copy and recall are determined as follows;
1. Central rectangle - subject begins by drawing large central rectangle and details are added 
in relation to this.
2. Detail rectangle - subject begins with a detail attached to the central rectangle, completes 
the rectangle and adds remaining details in relation to this.
3. Perimeter - subject begins by drawing the overall contour o f the figure without explicit 
differentiation o f the central rectangle and then adds internal details.
4. Piecemeal, good result - subject juxtaposes details one by one, without an organising 
structure.
5. Piecemeal, poor result - subject copies discrete parts o f the drawing, without any 
semblance of organisation.
6 Substitute - subject substitutes the drawing of a similar object, such as a boat or house.
7. Scrawl - Unrecognisable.
Classical Weigl (Weigl, 1941)
The Classical Weigl or Colour Form Sorting Test is used to measure an individual’s capacity
to shift thinking from one concept to another, while providing a minimum of directive
feedback which is only gradually provided after a sequence o f failures. The validity and
reliability of the task is well established and described in more detail in texts such as Lezak,
(1995). The task consists o f twelve tokens, four coloured red, four coloured blue, and four
coloured green and yellow. These are also subdivided into four squares, four circles and four
triangles. The aim o f the task is to use first one sorting criterion and then the other. The
scoring criteria use one o f six ratings. These include:
■
1. Superior pass - one in which the two main sorts are achieved easily and with minimum of 
instruction, and in which there is no ‘sequencing’ in either sort. Sequencing involves the 
intrusion o f one sort into the other, i.e. sorting by colour in which piles are invariably 
sequenced by shape or vice versa.
2. Pass - an ordinary pass is one 'xrhich is achieved with little or no prompting, but there may
be a sequencing intrusion in either one or both sorts.
3. Equivocal pass - a marginal pass which occurs when the two main sorts are accompanied 
by an interim sort, using design, e.g. piles & shape followed by design & colour & shape, 
but corrected to piles & colour on the instruction o f piles.
4. Equivocal fail - a more hesitant version of 3., where there may be two intermediary 
designs, or some perplexity before achieving the desired second sort.
5. Fail - occurs when it has finally become necessary to give a direct instruction to use the 
second criterion, i.e. how about colour (or shape)?”. If this is followed by ah adequate 
sort in which there is no sequencing, the score is 5.
6. Contaminated fail - when failure is also accompanied by a sequencing intrusion of the 
first sort, then this is a contaminated fail. It is also used for patients who completely fail 
the task, i.e. fail to achieve a second sort, perhaps because o f perseveration. However, it is
not used for those who refuse or fail to complete the task.
2.4 Procedure
i. Ethical Approval
After completing a formal application, permission to conduct the project was obtained from
the Special Hospital Research and Ethics committee. Written confirmation of this is
presented in Appendix iii.
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ii. Participant Consent
Following the identification of potential participants (both TRS and PD Controls), their 
Responsible Medical Officers (RMOs) and clinical teams were formally asked if  they had 
any objections to individuals being approached to take part in the project. The letter 
requesting permission from the RMO to approach individual patients is presented in 
Appendix iv. Once RMO consent was obtained, individual patients were approached and 
asked if they would be prepared to participate in the project. The introduction o f the project 
was by an initial verbal description followed by a written outline and patient consent form. 
This is presented in Appendix v.
iii. Research Interview
In total, this lasted approximately 40 minutes. Once individual consent had been obtained, a 
brief outline of the interview was given. This was followed by the completion of the ToM 
task or SRC. To reduce the risk of order effects, the presentation of measures was 
counterbalanced, with half of the participants receiving the ToM task first followed by the 
SRC, and half o f the participants receiving the SRC first followed by the ToM task. For the 
ToM stories, if  a participant wanted a story to be repeated, this was done only once.
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3. Results
Data analysis was completed using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists 
(SPSS) for Windows: The rationale for the choice o f statistical analysis was guided by 
professional statistical advice and the criteria for parametric and non parametric tests.
3.1 Demographic Information
Demographic details for the groups are presented in Table 1. For each group this 
includes the mean and standard deviation for age, number o f years detained in the 
Special Hospital, age at first psychiatric diagnosis, duration o f illness, educational 
qualifications and WAIS-R full scale IQ.
Table 1. Demographic Details Of Groups
Group Mean Age In 
Years (SD)
Mean Years 
Detained In Special 
Hospital (SD)
Mean Age .^t 
First
Psychiatric
Diagnosis
(SD)
Mean Years 
Duration Of 
Illness (SD)
Educational
Qualifications*
WAIS-R Full 
Scale IQ (SD)
0 1 2 3 4
I. Behavioural 
Signs (N=12)
41 (6.73) 
Range 29-51 '
10.5 (4.90) 
Range 5-17
23.5 (5.51) 
Range 18-35
17.16(5.16) 
Range 10- 
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9 2 0 1 0 N = ll
82.45 (9.16)
2. Passivity' 
Phenomena 
(N = ll)
44 (13.07) 
Range 30-68
12.8 (7.88) 
Range 5-29
26.45 (9.73) 
Range 17-51
15.90 (6.36) 
Range 6-25
8 2 0 0 1 N=10
97.00 (14.44)
3. Paranoid 
Delusions (N=14)
42 (7.87) 
Range 31-58
8.78(4.17) 
Range 2-15
26.7 (8.04) 
Range 18-48
17.0 (7.64) 
Range 7-34
10 2 1 1 0 N=13
86.69(13.85)
4. PD Controls 
(N=23)
34 (8.38) 
Range 20-50
4.6 (1.94) 
Range 1-8
25.78 (6.29) 
Range 18-38
8.65 (5.82) 
Range 2-30
15 7 0 0 1 N=23
96.08 (18.02)
* Educational Qualifications Key; 0 = None; 1 = ‘O ’ levels / C.S.E; 2 = ‘A ’ level; 3 = Diploma; 4 = Degree
Small sample sizes in each group and lack of homogeneity of variance among the data 
suggested that non parametric Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis o f variance (ANOVA) 
tests were appropriate to examine differences between the four groups in age, number 
o f years detained in the Special Hospital, age of first psychiatric diagnosis, duration of 
illness and WAIS-R full Scale IQ. A summary o f these results is presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Summary Table To Show Kruskal-Wallis One Way ANOVA Test
Results For Demographic Details Between Groups
Demographic Variable Kruskal-Wallis Value (H) d.f.
Age 10.33* 3
Number O f Years Detained 20.62** 3
Age O f First Fsychiatnc Diagnosis 1.40 3
Duration o f Illness 22.21** 3
WAIS-R Full Scale IQ (N=57) 9.55* 3
* Significant at p < .05, ** Significant at p < .0 1
i. Age Of Participants
Analysis indicated a significant difference between the four groups in their age. The 
three TRS symptom subgroups had mean ages in the early 40s and the PD controls 
had a mean age in the early 30s. Six Mann-Whitney U tests suggested that the 
differences were located between each of the TRS symptom subgroups and the PD 
controls. However, caution is required in the interpretation of these tests, as multiple 
comparisons increase the chance o f a significant result. A summary of these Mann- 
Whitney U test results is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Mann-Whitney U Tests Between Groups In Age
Comparisons N U Value Z Score Corrected For Ties
Behavioural Signs & Passivity Phenomena 23 62.5 -0.22
Behavioural Signs & Paranoid Delusions 26 76.0 -0.41
Behavioural Signs & PD Controls 35 74.5 -2.21*
Passivity Phenomena & Paranoid Delusions 25 72.5 -0.25
Passivity Phenomena & PD Controls 34 24.5 -2.19*
Paranoid Delusions & PD Controls 37 74.5 -2.71*
* Significant at p < .05
ii. Number Of Years Detained In Special Hospital
Analysis indicated a significant difference between groups in the number of years 
detained in the Special Hospital (see Table 2.). Although caution is needed in the 
interpretation of the results, six Mann-Whitney U tests suggested that the differences 
were located between each of the three TRS symptom subgroups and the PD controls.
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Table 1. shows that the three TRS symptom subgroups had mean years o f detainment 
in the 10 year range, whilst the PD controls had a mean o f just under 5 years. A 
summary o f the Mann-Whitney U test results is presented in Tjable 4.
Table 4. M ann-W hitney U Tests Between Groups In N um ber O f Years Detained 
In  Special Hospital
Comparisons N U Value Z Score Corrected For Ties
Behavioural Signs & Passivity Phenomena 23 59.0 -0.43
Behavioural Signs & Paranoid Delusions 26 64.5 -1.1
Behavioural Signs & PD Controls 35 44.0 -3.32**
Passivity Phenomena & Paranoid Delusions 25 56.5 -1.12
Passivity Phenomena & PD Controls 34 24.5 -3.79**
Paranoid Delusions & PD Controls 37 71.0 -2.85**
** Significant at p < .01 
\
iii. Age A t F irst Psychiatric Diagnosis
Analysis did not suggest a significant difference between groups in the age at which a 
psychiatric diagnosis was first given. Means for each group, presented in Table I., 
show that all four groups share a similar mean age of first psychiatric diagnosis 
(within their mid 20s).
iv. D uration O f Illness
Analysis indicated a significant difference between groups in the duration o f illness. 
With appropriate caution, because of the problems associated with multiple 
comparisons, six Mann-Whitney U tests suggested that these differences were located 
between the three TRS symptom subgroups and the PD controls. Table 1. shows that 
each o f the three TRS symptom subgroups had mean duration o f illness o f around 
fifteen years, whilst the PD control group had a mean duration o f illness o f just under 
nine years. The results o f the Mann-Whitney U tests are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5. Mann-Whitney ü  Tests Between Groups In Duration Of Illness
Comparison N U Value Z Score Corrected For Ties
Behavioural Signs & Passivity Phenomena 23 56.5 -0.43
Behavioural Signs & Paranoid Delusions 26 66.5 -0.33
Behavioural Signs & PD Controls 35 103.5 -3.87**
Passivity Phenomena & Paranoid Delusions 25 73.0 -0.22
Passivity Phenomena & PD Controls 34 121.0 -3.06**
Paranoid Delusions & PD Controls 37 155.0 -3.57**
** Significant at p < .01
V. Educational Qualifications
Small expected frequencies in each cell (less than 5) prevented a valid chi-square 
analysis of the educational qualifications categories by group as presented in Table 1. 
Although not a perfect solution, as expected frequencies continue to be low, when the 
educational qualification categories were combined into those with and those without 
any formal educational qualifications, a 4 x 2 chi-square analysis indicated a non 
significant association between group and educational qualifications (x “ = 0.45, d.f. = 
3, n.s.). The contingency table to accompany this analysis is presented in Table 6. 
This shows that the majority of participants were without formal educational 
qualifications (70%), with the remaining distribution of those with qualifications 
(30%) being relatively evenly spread across groups. However, there also appeared to 
be a slight trend for the PD controls to have educational qualifications.
Table 6. Contingency Table Between Combined Distribution Of Educational 
Qualifications & Groups
Group
Educational
Qualification
Bdiavioural
Signs
Passivity
Phenomena
Paranoid
Delusions
PD Controls Row Total
Nothing 9(15% ) 8 (12.3%) 10(16.7%) 15 (25%) 42(70% )
Have Quahfications 3(5% ) 3(5% ) 5 (8.3%) 8 (13.3%) 18 (30%.)
Column Total 12(20%) 11(18.3%) 14(23.3%) 23 (38.3%) 60 (100%)
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vi. WAIS-R Full Scale IQ
)  ■
Analysis indicated a significant difference between groups in WAIS-R Full Scale IQ. 
Despite the problems o f multiple comparisons, six Mann-Whitney U tests suggested 
significant differences between the behavioural signs symptom subgroup and both the 
passivity phenomena symptom subgroup and the PD controls. The results o f these 
Mann-Whitney U tests are presented in Table 7. In Table 1., it can be seen that the 
mean WAIS-R full scale IQ for the behavioural signs symptom subgroup was in the 
low 80s, the paranoid delusion symptom subgroup in the mid 80s, while both the 
passivity phenomena symptom subgroup mean and the PD controls mean lies in the 
high 90s.
Table 7. Mann-Whitney U Test Between Groups In WAIS-R Full Scale IQ
Comparisons N U Value Z Score Corrected For Ties
Behavioural Signs & Passivity Phenomena 23 18.5 -2.58**
Behavioural Signs & Paranoid Delusions 26 62.0 -0.55
Behavioural Signs & PD Controls 35 52.5 -2.73’ ’
Passivity Phenomena & Paranoid Delusions 25 40.0 -1.55
Passivity Phenomena & PD Controls 34 103.5 -0.45
Paranoid Delusions & PD Controls 37 104.5 -1.48
** Significant at p < .01
3.2 Inter-Rater Reliability Of SRC
The inter-rater reliability of the SRC was assessed using the ratings o f 12 participants. 
Analysis revealed that 10 of these were given the same rating by the independent 
raters and that the overall level of agreement based on all 12 ratings was 83.3%. More 
detailed examination o f both the patients where there was disagreement in symptom 
ratings revealed the first rater believed behavioural signs were the most predominant, 
whilst the second rater considered paranoid symptoms to be most predominant. An 
examination o f inter judge agreement in these 12 ratings using Cohen’s Kappa
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revealed a reliability of K = .77. This was interpreted as representing a good level of 
agreement between the 2 independent raters. The contingency table for this analysis is 
presented in Table 8.
Table 8. Contingency Table To Show The Level Of Inter-Rater Agreement For 
Assigning Twelve Participants Into One Of The Four Groups Using SRC
Rater 1
Rater 2
Behavioural
Signs
Passivity
Phenomena
Paranoid
Delusions
PD Controls Total Rating
Behavioural Signs 2 1 1 0 4
Passivity Phenomena 0 1 0 0 1
Paranoid Delusions 0 0 2 0 2
PD Controls 0 0 0 5 5
Total Rating 2 2 3 5 12
3.3 Svmptoih Profiles & ToM Perform ance
The normality o f the data was assessed using Kolmogorov-Smimov Goodness of Fit 
tests. These were performed on each of the three TRS symptom subgroups and the PD 
controls for each of the story question sections, i.e. first order reality questions, first 
order ToM questions, second order reality questions and second order ToM questions. 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 9. These analyses indicated that 
there was not a completely normal distribution of scores for all groups in each o f the 
question categories. A non parametric Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA was 
therefore considered the most appropriate method of analysis.
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Table 9. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness of F it Tests For Each Group In Each 
Category O f ToM Task
Question Category' Mean (SD) Z Value
Behavioural Signs
First Order Reality 100 (0.00) No yariance
First Order ToM 91.66 (28.86) 1.83**
Second Order Reality 97.21 (9.64) 1.84**
Second Order ToM 27.75 (23.90) 0.89
Passiyity Phenomena
First Order Reality 100 (0.00) No yariance
First Order ToM 100 (0.00) No yariance
Second Order Reality- 96.96(10.07) 1.75*
Second Order ToM 57.52 (21.55) 0.99
Paranoid Delusions
First Order Reality 100 (0.00) No yariance
First Order ToM 97.61 (8.92) 1.99**
Second Order Reality 85.67 (21.58) 1.46*
Second Order ToM 40.42 (32.47) 1.12
PD Controls
First Order Realit\- 100 (0.00) No yariance
First Order ToM 100 (0.00) No yariance
Second Order Reality- 92.74 2.29**
Second Order ToM 86.93 (19.46) 1.92**
* S ig n i f ic an t  at  p <  .05 .  ** S ig n i f i c an t  a t p  <  .01
I. First O rder Reality Questions
All 60 participants answered the first order reality questions correctly, with no 
variation between groups in responses. Therefore, no statistical analysis was 
performed. Mean percentages of questions answered correctly by each group are 
presented in Figure 1.
ii. First O rder ToM Questions
Examining the responses to the ToM questions for the first order stories indicated that 
all members of the passivity phenomena symptom subgroup, as well as all the PD 
controls, obtained 100% correct answers. However, one member of the behavioural 
signs symptom subgroup and one member o f the paranoid delusion symptom 
subgroup failed to obtain 100% correct answers (0 % and 66.6% correct respectively). 
Analysis using a Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA failed to find any significant
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differences between groups (H = 2.7, d.f. = 3, n.s.). This supports the null hypothesis 
(IHo) which predicted a non significant difference between each of the three TRS 
symptom subgroups and the PD controls in first order ToM performance. Figure 1. 
illustrates the mean percentage of first order ToM questions answered correctly by 
each group. Although the differences are non significant, it can be seen in Figure 1. 
that the behavioural signs symptom subgroup was the most impaired, with a mean of 
91.7 % (SD 28.9), followed by the paranoid delusion symptom subgroup, with a mean 
of 97.6 % (SD 8.9). There were no differences between the passivity phenomena 
symptom subgroup and the PD controls. Both these groups had means of 100 % 
(SD 0).
Figure 1. Mean Percentage O f First O rder Reality 
& ToM Questions Answered Correctly By 1 he 
Four Groups
g a
a  CO
□  R eality Q u estion s
□  i'oM  Q u estion s
iii. Second O rder Reality Questions
A Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA failed to find any significant between group 
differences in the percentage of second order reality questions passed (H = 4.48, d.f. 
= 3, n.s.) Figure 2. illustrates the mean percentage of reality questions answered
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correctly by each group. It can be seen in Figure 2., that the mean percentage of 
reality questions answered correctly by each group was above 80 in all cases.
Figure 2. Mean Percentage O f Second O rder 
Reality & ToM Questions Answered Correctly 
By The Four Groups
□  R eality Q u estion s  
O  I'oM Q u estion s
iv. Second O rder ToM Questions
To control for the influence of memory' on ToM performance, an analysis was carried 
out using only those participants who had passed all second order reality questions, 
i.e. with 100% scores. This produced a total sample of 48, with 11 in the behavioural 
signs subgroup, 10 in the passivity phenomena subgroup, 9 in the paranoid delusions 
subgroup and 18 in the PD controls. A Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA using these 
groups indicated a significant difference between groups in second order ToM 
perfonnance (H = 30.87, d.f. = 3, p < .01, corrected for ties). The mean percentages of 
second order ToM questions answered correctly by each of the three TRS symptom 
subgroups and PD controls is illustrated in Figure 2. The behavioural signs symptom 
subgroup was the most impaired in the second order ToM questions, with a mean of 
24.2% (SD 21.5) of questions answered correctly, followed by the paranoid delusions 
and passivity phenomena symptom subgroups, with means of 51.8% (SD 29.4) and 
56.6% (SD 22.5) respectively. The PD controls were the least impaired, with a mean
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;of 94.4 % (SD 12.8). To establish where these group differences were located, six 
Mann-Whitney U tests were performed between groups. The results o f these are 
presented in Table 10.
Table 10. Mann-Whitney U Tests Between Groups In Second Order ToM 
Questions
Group Comparison N U Value Z Score For Corrected Ties
Behavioural Signs & Passivity Phenomena 21 18.5 . -2.76**
Behavioural Signs & Paranoid Delusions 20 24.5 -2.16*
Behavioural Signs & PD Controls 29 1.5 -4.76**
Passivity Phenomena & Paranoid Delusions 19 37.5 -0.67
Passivity Phenomena & PD Controls 28 18.0 -3.88**
Paranoid Delusions & PD Controls 27 22.5 -3.50**
* Significant at p < .05, * *  Significant at p < .01
Although there are problems with multiple comparisons, the analyses suggested 
significant differences in second order ToM perfonnance between the PD controls 
and each of the TRS symptom subgroups. This is consistent with the means presented 
in Figure 2., which show that the three TRS symptom subgroups answered fewer 
second order ToM questions correctly than did the PD controls. The results support 
the hypothesis (IH i) which predicted that second order ToM performance would be 
significantly impaired in the three TRS symptom subgroups compared to the PD 
controls.
The results also suggested a significant difference in second order ToM performance 
between the behavioural signs symptom subgroup and the passivity phenomena 
symptom subgroup. This also supports the hypothesis (IHQ, which predicted such a 
difference. However, the significant difference between the behavioural signs 
symptom subgroup and the paranoid delusion symptom subgroup is consistent with 
the null hypothesis (IHo), which predicted that there would not be a significant 
difference between any o f the groups. The lack o f a significant difference between
41
the paranoid delusions and passivity phenomena subgroups also supports the null 
hypothesis (IH ,), which predicted there would not be a significant difference between 
the symptom subgroups in ToM performance.
Analysis of the responses to second order ToM question categories W  false belief, 
deception prediction, and deception explanation given by participant groups using 
three 2 x 4  chi-squares, indicated significant associations between groups and whether 
a pass or fail was obtained in all three o f the ToM question categories. The results o f 
these analyses are presented in i able 11. I he contingency tables accompanying these 
analyses are presented in Tables 12., 13. & 14. respectively. The results o f all these 
analyses suggested the majority of passes to the 3 ToM question categories were 
achieved by the PD controls.
Table 11. Chi-Square Test Results Between ToM Question Categories & Groups
Chi-Square { y } )  Value d.f.
False Belief & Groups 15.99** 3
Deception Prediction & Group 22.88** 3
Deception Explanation & Groups 31.60** 3
Table 12. Contingency Table Between False Belief Question Category & Groups
Group
Answer given in 
TuM question
Behavioural
Signs
Passivity-
Phenomena
Paranoid
Delusions
PD Ctmtrols Row Total
Fail 7 (14.6%) 1(2.1%) 1(2.1%) 1 (2.1%) 10(20.8% )
Pass 4 (8.3%) 9(18.8% ) 8 (16.7%) 17(35.5) 38 (79.2%)
Column Total 11(22.9%) 10 (20.8%) 9(18.8% ) 18(37.5%) 48 (100%)
Table 13. Contingency Table Between Deception Prediction Question Category & 
Groups
Group
Answer given in 
ToM question
Behavioural
Signs
Passivity
Phenomena
Paranoid
Delusions
PDCZcmtrols Row Total
Fail 11(22.9%) 5 (10.4%) 6 (12.5%) 2(4.2% ) 24 (50%)
Pass 0 (0%) 5 (10.4%) 3 (6.3%) 16(33.3% ) 24 (50%)
Column Total 11(22.9%) 10 (20.8%) 9(18.8% ) 18 (37.5%) 48 (100%)
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Table 14. Contingency Table Between Deception Explanation Question Category 
& Groups
Group .
Answer given in 
ToM question
Behavioural
Signs
Passivity
Phenomena
Paranoid
Delusions
PD Controls Row Total
Fail 11(22.9%) 7 (14.6%) i 6 (12.5%) 0 (0%) 24(50% )
Pass 0(0% ) 3(6.3% ) 3 (6.3%) 18(37.5% ) 24(50% )
Column Total 11(22.9%) 10 (20.8%) 9(18.8% ) 18 (37:5%) 48 (100%)
3.4 Second O rd er ToM  Perform ance & Neuropsychological Test Perform ance
In examining ToM performance and neuropsychological test performance in all 
groups, second order ToM performance was scored so that each participant was 
assigned to one o f four eategories. These eategories were those who failed to answer 
any ToM questions correctly, those who answered one ToM question correctly, those 
who answered two ToM questions correctly and those who answered all three ToM 
questions correctly. Because no between group variation in first order ToM 
performance was found, no comparison with neuropsychological test performances 
was carried out.
i. Comparison Between ToM Perform ance & W AIS-R Full Scale 10 
Three o f the 60 participants did not have WAIS-R full scale IQs and were excluded 
from this analysis. A Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA between the number o f  second 
order ToM questions passed and WAIS-R full scale IQ, indicated a significant 
between group difference (H = 9.78, d,f. = 3, p < .05). Although caution i§ needed in 
the interpretation o f the results, to establish where the significant group differences 
were located, six Mann-Whitney U tests were performed between the number o f 
second order ToM questions passed in WAIS-R full scale IQ. The results o f these 
analyses are presented in Table 15. They suggested significant differences between 
the no ToM questions passed group and the one, two and three ToM questions passed
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groups. These differences are confirmed by examining the mean WAIS-R full scale 
IQs in each o f the number o f ToM questions passed categories presented in Table 16. 
This shows that the no ToM questions passed group had a mean full scale IQ within 
the mid 70s, while the one, two & three ToM questions passed groups had mean full 
scale IQs vnthin the low to mid 90s. These results support the null hypothesis (2Ho) 
which predicted that second order ToM performance would be related to WAIS-R full 
scale IQ.
Table 15. M ann-W hitney U Tests Between Second O rder ToM  Questions Passed 
Groups In W AIS-R Full Scale IQ
Comparison N U Value Z Score Corrected For Ties
0 & 1 ToM Questions Correct 23 26.0 -2.00*
0 & 2 ToM Questions Correct 23 14.5 -2.78**
0 & 3 ToM Questions Correct 25 6.5 -3.43**
1 & 2 ToM Questions Correct 32 122.5 -0.21
1 & 3 ToM Questions Correct 34 143.0 -0.03-
2 & 3 ToM Questions Correct 34 143.5 -0.02
* Significant at p < .05, ** Significant at p < .01
Table 16. M ean WAIS-R Full Scale IQs By Number O f Second O rder ToM 
Questions Passed
Number Of ToM Questions Passed N Mean WAIS-R IQ (SD) Range
0 Questions Passed 7 76.6 (6.3) 6 8 - 8 6
1 Question Passed 16 95.2 (21.0) 73 - 1 50
2 Questions Passed 16 93.6(15.0) 75 -132
3 Questions Passed 18 92.1 (10.9) 8 0 - 1 1 4
ii. Comparison Between ToM  Perform ance & W M S-R Perform ance
The mean WMS-R scores for prose immediate recall, prose delayed recall, design 
immediate recall and design delayed recall by the number o f second order ToM 
questions passed are presented in Tables 17., 18., 19. & 20. respectively. A Kruskal- 
Wallis one way ANOVA for each WMS-R score by number o f second order ToM 
questions passed is presented in Table 21. These indicated a significant difference
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between groups in prose delayed recall scores and design delayed recall scores. No
differences were found in prose immediate and design immediate recall scores.
Table 17. M ean W M S-R Prose Imm ediate Recall Scores By N um ber O f Second 
O rd er ToM  Questions Passed
Number O f ToM Questions Passed . N Mean Score (SD) Range
0 Questions Passed 5 13.4(15.7) 2 - 4 0
1 Question Passed 17 16.5(17.4) 2 : 5 9
0 Questions Passed 5 32.5 (30.7) 3 - 9 7
3 Questions Passed 18 38.3 (29.6) 2 - 8 2
Table 18. M ean W M S-R Prose Delayed Recall Scores By N um ber O f Second 
O rder ToM  Questions Passed
Number O f ToM Questions Passed N Mean Score (SD) Range
0 Questions Passed 4 3.7 (3.5) 2 - 9
1 Question Passed 17 17.4(18.5) 0 - 6 9
2 Questions Passed 15 39.0 (33.1) 4 - 9 4
3 Questions Passed 18 39.2 (24.5) 9 - 8 3
Table 19. M ean W M S-R Design Immediate Recall Scores By N um ber O f Second 
O rder ToM  Questions Passed
Number O f ToM Questions Passed N Mean Score (SD) Range
0 (Questions Passed 6 24.3 (35.3) 1 -8 5
1 Question Passed. 17 26.4(31.7) 1 - 9 4
2 Questions Passed 16 42.8 (33.8) 3 - 9 7
3 Questions Passed 17 44.4 (32.3) 3 - 9 6
Table 20. M ean W M S-R Design Delayed Recall Scores By N um ber O f Second 
O rder ToM  Questions Passed
Number O f ToM Questions Passed N Mean Score (SD) Range
0 Questions Passed 5 8.8 (16.3) 1 - 3 8
1 Question Passed 17 22.1 (30.4) 1 - 8 8
2 Questions Passed 16 38.6(35.3) 0 - 99
3 (Questions Passed 17 38.6 (31.6) 2 - 9 8
Table 21. Kruskal-W allis One W ay ANOVA Results Between W M S-R 
Categories In The N um ber of Second O rder ToM Questions Passed
WMS-R Categories Kruskal-Wallis Value (H) d.f.
WMS-R Prose Immediate Recall 7.79 3
WMS-R Prose Delayed Recall - 16.74** 3
WMS-R Design Immediate Recall 6.64 3
WMS-R Design Delayed Recall 7.87* 3
* Significant at p < .05, ** Significant at p < .01
Analysis o f the differences between groups in prose delayed recall scores using six 
Mann-Whitney U tests suggested significant differences between the no and two ToM
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questions passed, no and three ToM questions passed, and one and three ToM 
questions passed. The results from these Mann-Whitney U tests are presented in 
Table 22. It can be seen in Table 18., that no ToM questions passed group had the 
lowest score, followed by the one ToM question passed group. The two and three 
ToM questions passed groups had similar, higher scores.
Table 22. Mann-Whitney U Test Results Between Number Of Second Order 
ToM Questions Passed For WMS-R Prose Delayed Recall Scores
Comparison N U Value Z Score (Corrected for Ties)
0 & 1 ToM Questions Passed 21 12.0 -1.97*
0 & 2 ToM Questions Passed 19 LO -2.90**
0 & 3 ToM Questions Passed 22 0.5 -3.02**
I & 2 ToM Questicms Passed 32 71.0 -2.13*
1 & 3 ToM Questions Passed 35 65.0 -2.90**
2 & 3 ToM Questions Passed 33 122.5 -0.45
* Significant at p < .05, ** Significant at p < .01
Analysis o f the differences between groups in design delayed recall scores using six 
Mann-Whitney U tests suggested significant differences between the no ToM 
question passed group and the three ToM questions passed group. Significant 
differences were also found between the one ToM question passed group and the 
three ToM questions passed group. The results from these Mann-Whitney U tests are 
presented in Table 23. These differences can be seen by examining the means 
presented in Table 20., which show that the no ToM questions passed group had the 
lowest score, followed by the one ToM question passed group. The two and three 
ToM questions passed groups had similar higher scores.
Table 23. Mann-Whitney U Test Results Between Number Of Second Order 
ToM Questions Passed For WMS-R Design Delayed Recall Scores
Canparison N U Value Z Score (Corrected for Ties)
0 f t  I ToM Questions Passed ?? 75 - 13 9
0 & 2 ToM Questions Passed 21 22.5 -1.46
0 ft; 3 ToM Questions Passed 21 11 -2.47*
1 f t  2 ToM Questions Passed 33 102 -1.23
1 f t  3 ToM Questions Passed 34 80 -2.22*
2 f t  3 ToM Questions Passed 33 130 -0.22
Significant at p < .05
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The results from the prose immediate recall and design immediate recall scores 
support the hypothesis (2Hi) o f a non significant association between ToM and 
WMS-R performance. However, the results from the prose delayed recall and the 
design delayed recall support the null hypothesis (2Ho) which predicted that ToM 
performance would be related to performance in neuropsychological tests of memory, 
i.e. that the greater the number o f second order ToM questions passed, the greater 
would be the raw scores in WMS-R prose delayed and design delayed recall.
ill. Comparison Between ToM Perform ance & CFT Perform ance
The categorical quality o f the CFT copy and recall sequence ratings, and the number 
o f second order ToM questions passed, suggested a Chi-square was the most 
appropriate method of analyses.
Copy Sequence Ratings
Due to low expected cell frequencies, categories were combined to create a 2 x 2 
contingency table between the number o f second order ToM questions passed (0 or 1 
or more), and pass or fail ratings in the CFT copy sequences. Analysis suggested a 
non significant association between number of second order ToM questions passed 
and the copy sequence ratings ( ^  = 0.01, d .f = 1, n.s ). Twenty four patients were 
without CFT copy sequence ratings and were excluded from the analysis. No 
participants obtained either a six (Substitute) or seven (Scrawl) rating. The 
contingency table to accompany the analysis is presented in Table 24. This shows, o f 
those participants having passed one or more second order ToM questions, similar 
numbers obtained 1 & 2 to those who obtained 3, 4 & 5 ratings in the CFT copy
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sequences. It also shows there was no difference in CFT copy sequence ratings among 
those who failed to pass any second order ToM questions.
Table 24. Contingency Table Between Number Of ToM Questions Passed & 
Performance In The CFT Copy Sequence Ratings
CFT Copy 
Sequence Ratings*
1 or more passed 0 passed Row Total
1 & 2 15(41.7% ) 2 (5.6%) 17(47.2%)
3,4 & 5 17(47.2% ) 2 (5.6%) 19 (52.8%)
Column Total 32 (88.9%) 4(11.1%) 36(100% ) .
*Key for CFT Copy Sequence Ratings:
1 - Central rectangle, 2 - Detail rectangle, 3 - Perimeter, 4 - Piecemeal, good result, 5 - Piecemeal, poor result
Recall Sequence Ratings
Due to low expected cell frequencies, categories were combined to create a 2 x 2 
contingency table between the number of second order ToM questions passed (0 or 1 
or more) and pass or fail ratings in the CFT recall sequences. Analysis suggested a 
non significant association between the number of second order ToM questions 
passed and the recall sequence ratings (%" = 0.91 d.f = 1, n.s ). Thirty four patients 
were without CFT recall sequence ratings and were excluded from the analysis. No 
participants obtained either a six (Substitute) or a seven (Scrawl) rating. The 
contingency table to accompany this analysis is presented in Table 25. Although not 
significant and cell numbers were small, this shows a small tendency for those who 
passed one or more second order ToM questions to obtain a recall sequence rating of 
one (Central rectangle) or two (Detail rectangle).
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Table 25. Contingency Table Between Number Of ToM Questions Passed &
Performance In The CFT Recall Sequence Ratings
CFT Recall 
Sequence Ratings*
1 or more passed Opassed Row Total
1 & 2 16(61.5% ) 2 (7.7%) 18 (69.2%)
3,4 & 5 7 (26.9%) 1 (3.8%) 8 (30.8%)
Column Total 23 (83.5) 3(11.5% ) 26(100% )
*Key for CFT Recall Sequence Ratings: v ^
1 - Central rectangle, 2 - Detail rectangle, 3 - Perimeter, 4 - Piecemeal, good result;^ - Piecemeal, poor result
Overall interpretation O f CFT Perform ance & ToM  perform ance
Both the results o f the CFT copy sequence ratings and the recall sequence ratings 
support the hypothesis (2Hi), which predicted that ToM performance and CFT 
performance would be unrelated.
iv. Comparison Between ToM  Perform ance & Classical Weigl
The categorical quality of the Classical Weigl ratings and the number of second order 
ToM questions passed, suggested a Chi-square was the most appropriate analysis. 
Four participants were without Classical Weigl ratings and were excluded from the 
analysis. Using a 2 x 2 contingency table between the number of second order ToM 
questions passed (0 or 1 or more) and pass or fail ratings in the Classical Weigl, 
suggested a significant association {y^ = 6.22, d .f = 1, p < .05 ). Thus, the number of 
second order ToM questions passed was significantly associated with Classical Weigl 
ratings. This supported the hypothesis (2Hq) which predicted ToM performance and 
Classical Weigl performance would be related. The contingency table to accompany 
this analysis is presented in Table 26. This shows a clear tendency among those who 
obtained pass ratings in the Classical Weigl to also pass one or more second order 
ToM questions.
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Table 26. Contingency Table Between Number Of ToM Questions Passed &
Classical Weigl Ratings
Classical Weigl 
Ratings*
Number o f  Second Order ToM Questions Passed
1 or more passed 0 passed Row Total
Pass i 40(71.4% ) 2 (3.6%) 42 (85%)
Fail = 10(17.9% ) 4(7.1% ) 14.(23%)
Column Total 50 (89.3%) 6(10.7% ) 56(100% )
*Classical Weigl Ratings, Pass = Superior^Pass, Pass or Equivocal Pass. Fail = Equivocal Fail, Fail or Contaminated 
Fail.
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4. Discussion
4.1 Summary Of Results
i. Demographic Details
The analysis o f p ^ c ip a n ts ’ demographic details including age, number o f  years 
detained in the Special Hospital, age at first psychiatric diagnosis, duration o f  illness 
and level Of educational attainment, suggested that the three TRS symptom subgroups 
were similar in all these variables. However, further analysis suggested the 
behavioural signs symptom subgroup had a statistically significant lower WAIS-R full 
scale IQ than the passivity phenomena symptom subgroup.
The analysis o f demographic variables also suggested significant differences between 
the three TRS symptom subgroups and the PD controls in age, number o f years 
detained in the Special Hospital and duration of illness. The behavioural signs 
symptom subgroup also had a significantly lower IQ than the PD controls. The PD 
controls mean age was approximately ten years younger than that o f the three TRS 
symptom subgroups, they had been detained in the Special Hospital for a shorter 
period o f time and had an illness duration o f just under nine years compared to the 
fifteen to seventeen years for the three TRS symptom subgroups. The four groups did 
not significantly differ in their age o f first psychiatric diagnosis or level of 
educational qualifications obtained.
In attempting to explain these differences, it would seem that, by definition, to be 
classified as ‘treatment resistant’, those individuals with schizophrenia would be 
older than those not classified as such. Consequently, it is likely that they will have 
been detained in the hospital for a longer period of time. Therefore, the lower number
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o f years detained in the Special Hospital and lower mean duration o f illness in the PD 
controls would appear to be accounted for by their younger age. These results are 
consistent with the Special Hospital’s own data on patients’ characteristics, which 
suggest that patients classified with psychopathic disorder are ten to fifteen years 
younger than those classified with mental illness and have been detained for shorter 
periods o f time (Hospital Patient Administration System, 1996).
To summarise, as all groups were fairly representative o f their respective patient 
groups within the hospital, the differences between groups suggested that the PD 
controls and TRS symptom subgroups differed in several ‘demographic’ ways 
including age, number o f years detained in the Special Hospital, duration o f illness 
and WAIS-R full scale IQ. As well as illustrating the difficulties in attempting to 
match forensic Special Hospital patient samples on demographic characteristics in 
group comparison studies, the differences may have implications for the 
interpretation o f the differences in ToM performance between the groups.
ii. Inter-rater Reliability Of SRC
The 83.3% level o f overall agreement and high Cohen’s Kappa value, suggest that the 
SRC. had a good level of agreement between independent raters. This suggests the 
independent raters used the measure to classify patients in a similar way and may 
demonstrate the checklist’s reliability in assigning patients to one o f the three TRS 
symptom subgroups.
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iii. First & Second Order Reality Questions
Because all participants from all groups answered all first order reality questions 
correctly, this suggests that there were no memory problems with the first j order ToM 
stories. Therefore, all participants were able to recall a target piece o f information 
thought to be crucial in the comprehension o f the ToM stories.
The results o f the second order reality questions were not as clear cut. O f the total 
sample o f 60 participants only 48 gave correct answers for all three second order 
reality questions, i.e. were able to recall a target piece o f information thought to be 
crucial in the comprehension of the ToM stories. Analysis suggested there were no 
differences between groups in the number o f second order reality questions passed. 
Therefore, the problems in recalling target information from the second order stories 
were not restricted to any particular group. These results therefore suggested the 
second order ToM stories may have a memory component, but that this did not appear 
to influence any one group more than another group. Thus, to remove the 
confounding influence o f memory, all those who failed to answer all second order 
reality questions correctly were excluded from the analysis o f second order ToM 
performance. Although the proportion o f participants who failed the second order 
reality questions was similar to that obtained by Frith & Corcoran (1996), the absence 
o f any differences between groups was not. Frith & Corcoran found their behavioural 
signs symptom subgroup performed worse than the other groups on this measure.
iv. First & Second Order ToM Questions
The results o f the first order ToM analysis suggested no significant difference
between the groups in performance. For all groups, most participants appeared able to
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appreciate that another may have a false belief about the physical state of the world. 
However, two participants, one classified with predominantly behavioural signs 
symptoms and one classified with predominantly paranoid delusion symptoms, failed 
to pass either all first order ToM questions (the predominantly behavioural signs 
symptoms participant) or two first order ToM questions (the predominantly paranoid 
delusion symptoms participant). Therefore, although the groups as a whole did not 
differ in first order ToM performance, there were two TRS participants, particularly 
the participant with predominantly behavioural signs symptoms, who had problems 
with first order ToM, despite answering all the first order reality questions correctly.
The results o f the second order ToM analysis suggested a significant difference 
between groups in performance, with each of the TRS symptom subgroups 
performing significantly worse than the PD controls. Therefore, the TRS symptom 
subgroups appeared to have difficulty' in appreciating that an individual may have a 
false belief about the mental state of another individual. Furthermore, as all 
participants who failed to pass all second order reality questions were excluded from 
the analysis, this suggested the second order ToM impairment was not due to a. failure 
to comprehend or remember the story. Combined, the results suggested that the 
behavioural signs symptom subgroup was the most impaired in second order ToM, 
followed by the paranoid delusion symptom subgroup and then by the passivity 
phenomena symptom subgroup. The results also showed that some members o f the 
PD control group failed to pass some of the second order ToM questions.
In terms o f the hypothesis ( IH J  and the studies by Corcoran et al. (1995), and Frith & 
Corcoran (1996), these results provide partial support for the prediction that the TRS
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symptom subgroups will be more impaired in ToM than the PD controls. The support 
is only partial, as the impairment was found only in second order ToM and not first 
order ToM. Thus, the results are not wholly consistent with IHi^ which predicted 
impairment in both first and second order ToM. The analysis o f the three TRS 
symptom subgroups is also only partially consistent with hypothesis IHi. This 
hypothesis predicted that the behavioural signs and the paranoid delusion symptom 
subgroups would be more impaired than the passivity phenomena symptom subgroup 
in second order ToM. However, the results suggested a significant difference only 
between the behavioural signs and passivity phenomena symptom subgroups, and not 
between the paranoid delusion and passivity phenomena symptom subgroups.
Several explanations may account for the failure to find complete support for the 
hypothesis (IH J. The first is that first order ToM impairments are not present in this 
sample of TRS patients. As these patients represent a highly specific sample of 
individuals with schizophrenia, it may be that they are not representative of the 
schizophrenia population as a whole and hence are very different from the sample 
studied by Corcoran et al. (1995) and Frith & Corcoran (1996). This suggestion is 
supported by the mixed profiles o f neuropsychological performance present in 
forensic patients with schizophrenia and highlighted in the introduction. For example. 
Barber (1994), found a forensic schizophrenia sample performed better than a non 
forensic sample in tests o f higher executive functioning.
As is discussed in more detail later, the second possibility is that the findings may 
also be due to one or more methodological shortcoming. O f particular importance is
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the relatively low number o f participants in each subgroup and the way in which 
participants were assigned to symptom subgroups.
V. Second Order ToM Performance & Neuropsvchological Test Performances
The results from the analysis of second order ToM and neuropsychological test 
performances (WAIS-R full scale IQ, WMS-R immediate and delayed prose recall, 
and immediate and delayed design recall, CFT copy and recall sequences and 
Classical Weigl ratings), suggest a mixed pattern o f findings. A significant 
relationship was found between an individual’s performance in the second order ToM 
questions, their WAIS-R full scale IQ, performance in the delayed recall of prose and 
designs of the WMS-R and ratings obtained in the Classical Weigl, but not with their 
CFT copy and recall sequence ratings.
In terms of the hypothesis (2H,), which predicted there would not be any relationship 
between ToM performance and neuropsychological test performance, the absence of 
a relationship between second order ToM performance and CFT ratings is consistent 
with this prediction. However, the relationship between second order, ToM 
performance, WAIS-R full scale IQ, WMS-R delayed prose and design results and the 
Classical Weigl support the null hypothesis (2Hq). A participant’s performance in the 
second order ToM stories therefore appears to be related to their WAIS-R full scale 
IQ, with a greater number o f correct responses to second order ToM questions being 
related to a higher full scale IQ. Likewise, performance in the second order ToM 
stories appeared to be related to raw scores in the delayed recall o f prose and designs 
sections of the WMS-R, with a greater number o f second order ToM questions passed 
related to better raw scores in the delayed recall o f prose and designs. In addition,
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individual’s who passed one or more second order ToM questions were more likely to 
obtain a pass rating in the Classical Weigl (test o f the ability to shift thinking from 
one concept to another). In contrast, an individual’s performance in the second order 
ToM stories appears to be unrelated to their CFT copy and recall sequence ratings. 
Therefore, an individual’s second order ToM performance was not significantly 
related to their performance in a test of organisation and planning. However, although 
not significant, the data suggested a small trend with individuals who passed one or 
more second order ToM questions also obtaining good CFT recall sequence ratings.
Although consistent with the results obtained by Corcoran et al. (1995), who found a 
positive correlation between IQ and performance in their hinting task within their 
schizophrenia patients, but not within their non patient ‘normal’ controls, the result is 
not consistent with those obtained by Frith & Corcoran (1996), who failed to find a 
significant difference between their schizophrenia patients and non psychotic and non 
psychiatric controls in IQ. More detailed analysis of the performance of individual 
symptom subgroups in second order ToM and full scale IQ was prevented by small 
sample sizes. This, and the absence of a normal distribution ' in the data, also 
prevented an analysis o f covariance (ANCOVA), which would have allowed the 
influence o f IQ to have been removed from the analysis of second order ToM.
In terms o f memory, it seems that participants who were the most impaired in the 
second order ToM task were also the most impaired in the WMS-R prose delayed 
recall and, to a lesser extent, in design delayed recall. This is unsurprising, as those 
3vith poor memories performed poorly in thé ToM task because they were less likely 
to remember the stories. However, as those participants who failed to answer all
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second order reality questions correctly were excluded from the analysis o f second 
order ToM performance between groups, it seems there may be rather more to the 
relationship than poor mem;ory. Although the results do not clear the confusion 
regarding the relationship between ToM and memory, they suggest the significance of 
memory for the delayed recall o f  prose material. However, the result is only 
suggestive and requires further investigation. This might aim to determine whether 
the relationship is a causal one or simply an association. As is discussed later, the 
ToM task has the problem of being memory ‘loaded’. Like the influence of WAIS-R 
full scale IQ, further statistical analysis using an ANCOVA with memory as a 
‘covariate’ on second order ToM performance would be useful to pursue.
4.2 Methodological Limitations O f Study
i. Although the study is suggestive o f a second order ToM impairment in the three 
TRS symptom subgroups in comparison to the PD controls, there were individual 
exceptions, with some TRS participants performing well in second order ToM. 
Likewise, there were some PD controls who did not perform well in second order 
ToM. This suggests the examination o f group averages overlooks important 
information about individual performances. Therefore, the group approach to 
examining such difficulties may be flawed and it may be that an individual case 
analysis would be more informative. This would allow an examination o f the 
individual peculiarities in ToM profiles and comparison with other individual 
variables such as other test information. The advantages o f using a single case 
methodology are discussed by Miller (1993), who suggests that group studies in 
neuropsychology are often misleading, particularly when there are discrepancies in 
results between studies. In addition, the use o f a group study often assumes groups are
homogeneous in some qualities. As was demonstrated by the differences in 
demographic characteristics, this is not the case in the present study, with the TRS 
and PD controls groups appearing to differ in most characteristics. Therefore, any one 
or more o f these differences may have contributed to the group differences found here 
in ToM performance.
ii. In support o f the individual case approach is the problem concerned with the 
relatively small sample sizes in each of the TRS symptom subgroups. As this was a 
highly specific sample of individuals with schizophrenia, there was only a limited 
number o f potential participants in the hospital. Consequently, those who decided to 
take part in the study were a highly selective sample. In addition, although the sample 
were representative of specific sections of hospital patients, individuals all had in 
common their consent to participate in the study. In contrast, there were a small 
sample of patients, particularly those with paranoid features, who were perhaps the 
most clinically interesting, but who refused to participate in the study. These 
individuals may have produced a different profile of ToM performance.
iii. As has been described previously, the participants all had in common their consent 
and agreement to participate in the study. Although this may not be a significant 
factor within a non forensic setting, within secure environments such as a Special 
Hospital, agreement to take part in research studies is an important factor to discuss, 
as has been described in more detail by Gresswell & Kruppa (1994) and Megargee 
(1995). This is especially so because o f the higher degree o f caution often present 
among patients regarding the disclosure o f personal information which affects 
motivation to take part in research. The sample included in the analysis is therefore
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biased in that it reflects only the performances o f those patients who were willing to 
take part.
iv. As all the patients were contained within a highly structured environment, which 
constantly seeks to alter their attitudes, personality and behaviour, it may have had 
implications on the way in which patients responded to the ToM task. Unlike a non 
forensic out-patient sample, such as that described by Frith & Corcoran (1996), the 
present sample were only open to a limited number of experiences within the hospital 
and therefore may have been less able to practise ToM skills or at least less used to 
situations used within the ToM task. A ToM task which is more ‘tuhed’ in to the 
patients immediate environment may therefore be more relevant and valid.
V. The ToM task is limited in that it relies on memory' as well as on ToM abilities. As 
is noted by Frith & Corcoran (1996), the ToM task and particularly the second order 
stories are. memory loaded. In their study, individuals failed the reality questions as 
well as the ToM questions. This was the case in the current study, with 12 participants 
(20%) o f the total sample failing to pass all the reality questions associated with the 
second order stories. With the exclusion of these participants from the analysis of 
second order ToM performance, the sample size was reduced even further. In 
addition, an alternative interpretation o f the results may be that the second order ToM 
performance o f those participants who passed all the reality questions, may be 
dependent on ‘good’ memories rather than ‘good’ ToM abilities. The development of 
a task which covers both first and second order ToM and in which both ToM tasks are 
less ‘memory loaded’ is tlicrcforc needed before it will be possible to separate out the 
effects o f memory from ToM abilities.
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vi. The SRC may be limited in its way of classifying individuals according to their 
predominant symptoms. Although producing a good level o f inter-rater agreement, the 
SRC is open to bias in that it attempts to classify and categorise individuals according 
to their most predominant symptom. This could be problematic, as there is the 
question o f whether it is accurate to divide individuals with schizophrenia into 
discrete categories. For example, within the TRS sample, there were no participants 
with just behavioural signs, just passivity phenomena or just paranoid delusions. In 
contrast, the majority of the TRS participants had symptoms from more than one 
symptom category and in many cases the highest score m a particular symptom 
category was used to determine the symptom subgroup into which they were placed. 
Although convenient for research purposes, this classification system used here to 
divide the TRS sample into symptom subgroups is limited.
4.3 Theoretical Implications
The results are partially consistent with the theoretical background of ToM in 
schizophrenia described by Frith (1992, 1994). Specifically, in terms of the empirical 
evidence to date, they support only the second order ToM deficit account of 
schizophrenia, and provide no evidence that first order ToM is also impaired in a 
schizophrenia sample. Therefore, the TRS sample’s performance as a whole 
suggested they were able to appreciate that an individual may have a false belief 
about the physical state of the world, but that they had difficulty in appreciating that 
an individual may have a false belief about the mental state o f another individual. 
This difficulty also appears to be particularly worse in those TRS participants with 
behavioural signs as their predominant symptoms. These results are not conclusive 
and need to be repeated with a larger sample size and using a more valid system of
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assigning participants to specific symptom subgroups. Nevertheless, it remains the 
case that the results may reflect real differences between TRS forensic and non 
forensic schizophrenia samples.
Adding to the confusion vdthin the theoretical framework o f ToM in schizophrenia, is 
the finding o f a significant relationship between second order ToM performance and 
general intellectual functioning (WAIS-R full scale IQ), a significant relationship 
between second order ToM and delayed memory performance (WMS-R, prose and 
design delayed recall), and a significant relationship between second order ToM and 
the ability to shift thinking from one concept to another (Classical Weigl ratings). The 
relationship between ToM and general intellectual functioning does not support Frith 
(1992, 1994), who suggested that ToM ability is IQ independent and not related to 
general intellectual functioning. In contrast, the results presented here suggest that in 
order to have good second order ToM abilities, a minimum level o f general 
intellectual functioning is required. Therefore, it is possible that the two abilities are 
connected in some way. However, whether the two abilities are causally related or 
merely correlated, remains to be established. Given that there may indeed be some 
form of relationship between intellectual functioning and second order ToM, it may 
be informative to examine the link more closely, including whether, for example, 
ToM abilities are related to verbal or visual spatial skills. In addition, with large 
enough numbers, it would be interesting to examine the ToM abilities o f ‘high’ and 
‘low’ IQ groups. A similar interpretation and method may be applied to the positive 
relationship between second order ToM performance and performance ratings in the 
Classical Weigl (ability to shift thinking from one concept to another). For both 
positive relationships, it means that it is not possible to say the passing o f ToM
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questions was determined by the ability to understand other’s mental states, since it 
may have also been determined by good general intellectual functioning and good 
higher executive functioning (particularly the ability to shift thinking from one 
concept to another).
In terms o f the finding o f a relationship between second order ToM and low raw 
scores in the WMS-R delayed recall o f prose and designs, this also suggests that the 
two abilities may be related (at least in terms of the task used). Therefore, having 
good second order ToM ability may be related to having good delayed recall o f both 
prose and design material. Frith (1992, 1994), notes that he is unclear about the 
relationship between ToM and memory. However, the results obtained here provide 
some evidence to suggest that second order ToM performance and delayed memory 
ability, particularly for prose material, are related. However, as previously described, 
the ToM task used in the current study may be ‘memory loaded’. In order to be 
certain of the relationship between ToM and memory, a task would need to be 
developed which is less dependent on memory. This may be easier in theoiy than 
practice, as the ability to appreciate the mental states o f others must be dependent 
upon a minimum level o f memory.
Consistent with the theoretical framework of Frith (1992, 1994), is the finding that 
second order ToM performance was not related to formal tests o f organisation, 
planning (i.e. CFT copy and recall sequences). This finding suggests that second order 
ToM may be determined by a skill separate from those involved in the organisation 
and planning o f material. Although this had been speculated to be the case by Fnth 
(1992, 1994), it had not previously been assessed formally.. However, although the
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relationship was not significant, a small trend was observable in the data to suggest 
that there might indeed be a link, where good second order ToM ability was 
associated with better CFT recall ratings in organisation and planning. With a larger; 
sample size, it would be interesting to re-examine this relationship.
4.4 Clinical Implications
As the results obtained are suggestive of a second order ToM impairment in the TRS 
symptom subgroups, there are several potential clinical implications.
With the recognition of a ToM impairment in some patients with schizophrenia 
within the hospital, are the potential implications for clinical management. As well as 
helping to account for some of the ‘odd’ behaviour and social skills deficits present in 
this patient group, recognising second order ToM impairments, might allow 
adjustments to be made in the everyday situations encountered by patients (i.e. 
developing ‘ToM friendly environments’). In addition, with more research, 
recognising a second order ToM deficit in schizophrenia could stimulate the 
development of an intervention targeted at improving existing ToM abilities. This 
may be particularly significant given the likely relationship between ToM 
performance and general intellectual functioning and memory. Green (1991), in a 
' review article, argued that the identification o f cognitive deficits in schizophrenia 
represents the first step towards developing effective remediation strategies. Although 
not directed towards ToM deficits. Green suggests, that from models similar to that 
used in the rehabilitation o f head injured patients, a number o f possible techniques 
could be developed for the re-training o f cognitive deficits found in patients with 
schizophrenia. The development o f an intervention targeted at improving ToM
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abilities would seem to be particularly important in terms o f the relationship between 
social skills and outcome. As highlighted in the introduction, having ToM skills 
appears crucial in possessing good social skills, and possessing good social skills 
appears to be a strong predictor o f a positive outcome and low risk o f relapse in 
schizophrenia (e.g. Mueser et a l ,  1990; Johnstone et a l ,  1990).
Another potential clinical implication o f recognising a second order ToM impairment 
in some forensic patients with schizophrenia is the possible relationship with the 
future risk o f re-offending. As ToM may be closely associated with an individual’s 
capacity to empathise with another and perhaps feel guilt (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1996), it 
might be hypothesised that an individual with a second order ToM impairment would 
not be able to empathise with another. The development of a ToM assessment within 
the context of a risk assessment might therefore be useful. This may be particularly 
significant, since such tasks would appear to be beyond bluffing, unlike many 
empathy tasks, since ToM answers are not influenced by what is the ‘socially 
desirable’ answer. However, this view is also dependent on the assumption that 
having ToM ability is independent o f other abilities, such as problem solving and 
organisation skills. Although this area needs to be explored further, preliminary 
evidence obtained in the current study suggests, within the current sample, ToM 
performance is unrelated to performance in tests o f organisation and planning, but is 
related to the ability to shift one’s thinking from one concept to another.
4.5 Future Research
This should begin by attempting to improve the methodological limitations previously 
highlighted, such as increasing the sample size as a whole and improving the validity /
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system of categorising TRS symptom subgroups. In addition, the use o f a single case 
analysis approach in which ToM performance is examined at an individual level may 
be more informative than a group comparison approach. This would allow a more 
comprehensive investigation o f ToM performance in relation to a variety o f other 
factors such as personal history, diagnosis, performance in other cognitive & non 
cognitive tests and past & present behaviours. This is supported by the individual 
exceptions to the overall group performances in the current study, i.e. that some 
members o f the TSR symptom subgroup were not impaired in second order ToM and 
that some members o f the PD controls were impaired in second order ToM.
As a forensic sample, it would be interesting and perhaps useful, to examine the 
relationship between ToM performance and offence history. Such an examination 
may provide insight into why some offences occurred. As highlighted, it might also 
have implications for the assessment o f future risk of re-offending. This analysis 
could be conducted at a group level, in which specific offence categories could be 
compared, and at an individual, case analysis level, in which the individual 
circumstances o f an offence could be examined in terms o f a ToM framework. With 
the availability o f such information in patient records kept in the hospital, the 
potential for conducting this research is possible and would provide an interesting 
addition to the current study.
Unlike most non forensic community samples, the availability of other information 
from records would allow individual ToM performance to be compared with a 
number o f other variables. For most patients, these include a wide range of historical 
background information such as developmental, family, schooling, work, drug and
66
alcohol abuse and offence, histories. There is also more recent information available 
including more detailed neuropsychological profiles and, for some patients, 
neurophysiological information such as various forms o f electrophysiological (e.g. 
EEG) and brain scans. The addition o f the ToM data might therefore provide a useful 
complement to the existing data base o f patient information. It would also allow the 
testing o f several hypotheses about ToM performance, which at present remain 
speculations, such as the relationship between impaired ToM ability and brain 
damage in the frontal and posterior regions (p. 158, Frith, 1994).
In the longer term, outcome research is also possible. TRS participants could be re­
tested at various points in the future, such as prior to being transferred from the 
hospital. This would allow the hypothesis of whether ToM ability is a ‘trait’ or a 
‘state’ characteristic to be assessed. Following Frith & Corcoran’s (1996) reasoning, 
an improvement in an individual’s clinical condition should be associated with an 
improvement in their ToM ability, i.e. it is a ‘state’ characteristic. If second order 
ToM is related to general intellectual functioning, a similar improvement might also 
be expected in IQ.
4.6 Conclusions
i. There are significant differences between the TRS symptom subgroups and the PD 
controls in demographic characteristics including age, number o f years detained in the 
Special Hospital and duration o f illness. Specifically, the TRS symptom subgroup 
were significantly older, had been detained for longer and had been ill for a longer 
period o f time.
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ii. There were no significant differences between the TRS symptom subgroups and 
PD controls in the age first given a psychiatric diagnosis and in the distribution of 
educational qualifications. However, the behavioural signs symptom subgroup had a 
mean WAIS-R full scale IQ significantly lower than that o f the PD controls, the 
passivity phenomena and paranoid delusion symptom subgroups.
iii. There were no significant differences between the three TRS symptom subgroups 
and PD controls in first order ToM, but all three TRS symptom subgroups were 
significantly more impaired than the PD controls in second order ToM. There were 
also differences within the three TRS subgroups in second order ToM, with the 
behavioural signs symptom subgroup being significantly more impaired than the 
passivity phenomena and paranoid delusion symptom subgroups.
iv. Impaired performance in second order ToM appears to be related to lower general 
intellectual functioning (WAIS-R full scale IQ) and poor delayed recall o f both prose 
and design material (WMS-R, prose delayed recall and designs delayed recall).
V. Second order ToM performance, organisational and planning abilities (using CFT 
copy and recall sequences) appear to be unrelated, whilst second order ToM 
performance and the ability to shift thinking from one concept to another (using 
Classical Weigl), appear to be related.
vi. Combined, the results obtained from the present study provide partial support for 
the theoretical framework o f ToM in schizophrenia outlined by Frith (1992, 1994).
«
Discrepancies with Frith’s theoiy may suggest methodological differences between 
the studies, including for example the way participants were assigned to symptom 
subgroups. However, it, also suggests that there may be a real difference in second 
order ToM between a -treatment resistant’ forensic schizophrenia sample and a non 
‘treatment resistant’ non forensic schizophrenia sample.
vii. Theoretical framework and methodology are closely related, with the ToM task 
used being heavily memory loaded. Therefore, it is not possible to be certain that 
ToM is independent of other cognitive abilities until a TuM task is developed which 
is not influenced by other cognitive abilities.
viii. Individual performances suggest there are some who possess ToM abilities who 
should not, and some who do not, but who should, assuming that the theory is correct. 
This suggests a single case analysis approach may be more informative than a group 
comparison approach in examining why some patients with schizophrenia have ToM 
problems whilst other do not.
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Appendix i.
ToM Task, & Reality & ToM Questions
Theory of Mind (ToM) Answer Sheet
Number.
Answer Summary
1. First Order False Belief
ToM Question.........
Memory Question......
2. First Order Deception - Prediction
ToM Question.........
Memory Question......
3. First Order Deception - Explanation
ToM Question.........
Memory Question......
Overall First Order ToM performance % of questions correctly answered.
Overall First Order memory performance % of questions correctly answered.
4. Second Order False Belief
ToM Question.........
Memory Question......
5. Second Order Deception - Prediction
ToM Question.........
Memory Question......
6. Second Order Deception - Explanation
ToM Question.........
Memory Question......
Overall Second Order ToM performance % of questions correctly answered
Overall Second Order memory performance % of questions correctly answered.
Theory O f Mind (ToM) Stories and Questions 
First O rder False Belief
John has five cigarettes left in his packet He puts his packet on the table and goes out o f the 
room. Meanwhile, Janet comes in and takes one of John's cigarettes and leaves the room without 
John knowing.
TOM  Question:
When John comes back for his cigarettes, how many does he think he has left?
Memory Question:
How many cigarettes are really left in John's packet?
First O rder Deception - Prediction
Mary has a box of chocolates which she puts in her top drawer for safe keeping. A few minutes 
later Burglar Bill comes in and asks Maiy; "Where are your chocolates, in the top or the bottom 
drawer?". Mary doesn't want Bill to find her chocolates.
TOM  Question:
In which drawer does Mary say her chocolates are, the bottom or the top? Why?
Memory Question:
Where are the chocolates really?
First O rder Deception - Explanation.
Sarah has saved £1 which she puts in her piggy bank where she thinks it will be safe. A little later 
Sly Sid comes along and asks Sarah: "Have you put your £1 in your piggy bank or your money 
box?". Sarah answers: "it's in my money box ".
TOM Question:
Why does Sarah say that the £1 is in her money box?
Memory Question:
Where is the £1 really?
Second Order False Belief
Sally and Ian are at the station because Sally has to catch a train home. Sally lives in Homesville 
but the train does not stop at Homesville station. Sally will have to get off at Neartown and walk. 
Sally goes to buy a magazine to read on her journey before she buys her ticket While she is gone 
there is an alteration to the timetable and the train is now going to stop at Homesville. The guard 
tells Ian about this change and Ian sets off to find Sally to tell her but before Ian finds her, the 
guard meets Sally and tells her: "The train will now stop at Homesville ". Ian eventually finds 
Sally who has just bought her ticket
TOM Ouestion:
Which station does Ian think that Sally has bought her ticket for?
Memory Ouestion:
Where has Sally really bouglit her ticket for?
Second Order Deception - Prediction
Burglar Bill has just robbed a bank and is running away from the police when he meets his 
brother Bob. Bill says to Bob: "Don't let the police find me, don't let them find me!", then he runs 
off and hides in the church yard. The police have looked everywhere for Bill except the church 
yard and the park. When they come across Bob they were going to ask him: "Where is Bill? Is he 
in the park or the church yard?". But the police recognise Bob and they realise that he will try to 
save his brother. They expect him to lie and so wherever he tells them, they will go and look in 
the other place. But Bob, who is very clever and does want to save his brother, knows that the 
police don't trust him.
TOM Ouestion:
Where will Bob tell the police to look for Bill, in the church yard or in the park? Why?
Memory Ouestion:
Where is Bill really hiding?
Second Order Deception - Explanation
Peter has bought a can o f Coke which he leaves on the table while he goes out to answer the 
phone. While he is gone. Chubby Charles comes in and takes Peter’s drink and puts it into his 
own locker. Greedy Greg, who is Chubby Charles's friend, sees what Charles has done and so 
Charles promises Greg half o f the drink if he doesn't let Peter know where his Coke is. 
Mean>\hile Peter has gone looking for his can o f Coke and he has searched everybody's lockers 
except for Nasty Nina's and Chubby Charles's. He sees Greedy Greg and he asks him: "Where is 
my can of Coke, is it in Charles's or Nina's locker?". Peter knows that Greg and Charles are good 
friends and so he expects Greg to protect Charles. Greg is very cunning though and he says: 
"Your Coke is in Charles's locker ".
TOM Ouestion:
Why does Greg tell Peter that his Coke is in Charles’s locker?
Memory Question:
Where is the Coke really?
Appendix ii. 
SRC
Symptom Rating Scale
Number..,.........
Summary
Symptom group =
% O f Behavioural S igns.................
% O f Passivity Phenomena..............
% O f Paranoid Delusions...............
Behavioural Signs
1. Lack of A ppropriate Emotion (CPRS - 45) - O bservation
Representing blunting o f affects as shown by lack o f emotional expression, or the occurrence 
o f incongruous emotional displays which are clearly out o f keeping with the situation.
Distinguish from apparent sadness (41) and elated mood (42)'.
0 Appropriate affect in keeping with mood.
1 Apparent lack of concern, slightly odd displays of emotion.
2 Responds in a clearly inappropriate way on sensitive issues, or appears not to respond at all.
3 Only clearly bizarre emotional responses, or total emotional indifference.
2. Unchanging Facial Expression (SANS - 1) - Observation
The patients face appears wooden, mechanical and frozen. It does not change expression or 
change less than normally expected as the emotional content o f discourse changes. Since 
phenothiazines rnay partially mimic this effect, the interviewer should be careful to note 
whether or not the patient is on medication.
0 - Not at all. Patient is normal or labile.
1 - Questionable decrease.
2 - Mild. Occasionally the patient's expression is not as full as expected.
3 - Moderate. Patient's expressions are dulled overall, but not absent.
4 - Marked. Patient's face has a flat 'set'.look, but flickers o f affect arise occasionally.
5 - Severe. Patient's face looks 'wooden' and changes little, if  at all throughout the interview.
3. Paucity of Expressive Gestures (SANS - 1) - Observation
The patient does not use his body as an aid in expressing his ideas, through such means as 
hand gestures, sitting forward in his chair when intent on a subject, leaning back when
relaxed, etc. This may occur in addition to decreased spontaneous movements.
0 - Not at all. Patient uses expressive gestures normally or excessively.
1 - Questionable decrease.
2 - Mild. Some decrease in expressive gestures.
3 - Moderate. Patient uses body as an aid in expression at least three or four times.
4  ^Marked. Patient uses body as an aid in expression only Once or twice.
5 - Severe. Patient never uses body as an aid to expression.
4. Affective Non-Responsivity (SANS - 5) - Observation
Failure to smile or laugh when prompted may be tested by smiling or joking in a way which 
would usually effect a smile from a normal individual. The examiner may also ask. "Have 
you forgotten how to smile?" while smiling himself.
0 - Not at all.
1 - Questionable decrease.
2 - Mild. Slight but definite lack in responsivity.
3 - Moderate. Patient occasionally seems to miss the cues to respond.
4 - Marked. Patient seems to miss the cues to respond most of the time.
5 - Severe. Patient essentially unresponsive, even on prompting.
5. Lack of Vocal Inflections (SANS - 6) - Observation
While speaking the patient fails to show normal vocal emphasis patterns. Speech has a 
monotonous quality, and important words are not emphasised through changes in pitch or 
volume. Patient may also fail to change volume with changes of subject so that he does not 
drop his voice when discussing private topics or raise il as he discusses things which are 
exciting or for which longer speech might be appropriate.
0 - Not at all. Normal vocal inflection.
1 - Questionable decrease.
2 - Mild. Slight decrease in vocal inflections.
3 - Moderate. Interviewer notices several instances o f flattened vocal inflection.
4 - Marked. Obvious decrease in vocal inflection.
5 - Severe. Patients speech is a continuous monotone.
6. Poverty of Content of Speech (SANS - 9) - Observ ation
Although replies are long enough so that speech is adequate in amount, it conveys little 
information. Language tends to be vague, often over-abstract or over-concrete, repetitive, and 
stereotyped. The interviewer may recognise this finding by observing that the patient has 
spoken at some length but has not given adequate information to answer the question. 
Alternatively, the patient may provide enough information, but require many words to do so, 
so that a lenÿhy reply can be summarised in a sentence or two. Sometimes the interviewer 
may characterise the speech as 'empty philosophising'. :
Exclusions
This finding differs from circumstantiality, in that the circumstantial patient tends to provide
a wealth of detail.
Example
Interviewer: "Why is it, do you think, that people believe in God?"
Patient: "Well, first o f all because, he uh, he are the person that, is their personal saviour. He 
walks with me and talks with me. And uh, the understanding that I have urn, a lot o f peoples, 
they don’t really uh know they own personal self. Because, uh, they ain't, they all, just don't 
know they personal se lf They don't know that he uh, seemed like to me, a lot of 'em don't 
understand that he walks and talks with them."
0 - No poverty o f content of speech.
1 - Questionable.
2 - Mild. Occasional replies are too vague to be comprehensible or can be markedly 
condensed.
3 - Moderate. Frequent replies are vague or can be markedly condensed to make up at least a 
quarter of the interview.
4 - Marked. At least half of the patient's speech is composed of vague or incomprehensible 
replies.
5 - Severe. Nearly all the speech is vague, incomprehensible or can be markedly condensed.
7. Incoherent Speech (CPRS - 57) - Observation
Representing circulatory disorganised or apparently illogical speech with inexplicable shifts 
from topic to topic, distortion and fragmenting of syntax, and words.
Distinguish from flight o f ideas.
0 - Coherent and understandable speech.
1 - Pedantic and slightly circumlocutory speech. Some idiosyncratic but comprehensible use 
o f words or phrases, especially under stress.
2 - Illogical association between words or phrases, even when not under stress. 'Knight's 
move' shifts.
3 - Obviously disjointed and illogical speech. Fragmentation.
8. Decreased Spontaneous Movements (SANS 2) - Observation
The patient sits quietly throughout the interview and shows few or no spontaneous 
movements. He does not shift position, move his legs, move his hands etc., or does so less 
than normally expected.
0 - Not at all. Patient moves normally or is overactive.
1 - Questionable decrease.
2 - Mild. Some decrease in spontaneous movements.
3 - Moderate.IPatient moves three or four times during the interview.
4 - Marked. Patient moves once or twice during the inten ,ew.
5 - Severe. Patient sits immobile throughout the interview.
9. Conceptual Disorganisation (BPRS - 4) - Observation
Degree to which the thought processes are confused, disconnected or disorganised. Rate on 
the basis o f integration of the verbal products of the patient; do not rate on the basis o f the 
patient's subjective impression of his own level of functioning.
0 - Not present
1 - V mild
2 - Mild
3 - Moderate
4 - Mod severe
5 - Severe
6 - X severe
10. Poverty of Speech (SANS 8) - Observation
Restriction in the amount of spontaneous speech, so that replies to questions tend to be brief, 
concrete and unelaborated. Unprompted additional information is rarely provided. Replies 
may be monosyllabic and some questions may be left unanswered altogether. When 
confronted with this speech pattern, the interviewer may find himself frequently prompting 
the patient in order to encourage elaboration of replies. To elicit this finding, the examiner 
must allow the patient adequate time to answer and to elaborate his answer.
0 - No poverty of speech. A substantial and appropriate number o f replies to questions 
include additional information.
1 - Questionable poverty o f speech.
2 - Mild. Occasional replies do not include elaborated information even thought this is 
appropriate.
3 - Moderate. Some replies do not include appropriately elaborated information, and some 
replies are monosyllabic or very brief ("Yes." "No." "Maybe." "I don't know" "Last week").
4 - Marked. Answers are rarely more than a sentence or a few words in length.
5 - Severe. Patient says almost nothing and occasionally fails to answer questions.
11. Global Rating of Affective Flattening (SANS - 7) - Observation
The global rating should reflect on overall severity of affective flattening or blunting. Special 
emphasis should be given to such core features as unresponsiveness, inappropriateness, and 
an O v e r a l l  decrease in emotional intensity.
0 - No flattening. Normal affect.
1 - Questionable affective, flattening.
2 - Mild affective flattening.
3 - Moderate affective flattening.
4 - Marked affective flattening.
5 - Severe affective flattening.
Passivity Phenomena
1. Hallucinatory Behaviour (BPRS - 12) - Questioning
Perception without normal external stimulus correspondence. Rate only those experiences 
which are reported to have occurred witlhn the last week and which are described as 
distinctly different from the thought and imagery processes of normal people.
0 - Not Present ^
1 - V Mild
2 - Mild
3 - Moderate
4 - Mod Severe
5 - Severe
6 - X Severe
2. Feeling Controlled (CPRS - 29) - Questioning
Representing the experience o f being in the literal sense influenced or controlled from 
without, and the experience that feelings, impulses, or volition’s are imposed from without.
Also rated under this heading is the experience of being able to control others in a similar 
manner.
Distinguish from disrupted thoughts (10) and ideas of persecution (13).
0 - Ordihaiy' influence from social forces.
1 - Vague or unconvincing report o f being unnaturally influenced from without.
2 -. Occasional but clear experiences o f being controlled from without, e.g. by means ^of 
hypnosis.
3 - Continuous experiences that feelings or impulses do not derive from oneself, but are 
forced into one, say by means of rays.
3. Disrupted Thoughts (CPRS - 30) - Questioning
Representing the experience of a sudden stoppage o f thoughts (thought blocking), or thoughts 
being put into one’s head (insertion), or being taken out (withdrawal), or listened to or 
biOadcasL
Distinguish from compulsive thought, and concentration difficulties.
0 - No thought interruptions.
1 - Vague or unconvincing reports o f episodes or interruptions to thought.
2 - Occasional but clear thought blocking or occasional episodes o f thought insertion or 
withdrawal. Feeling that thoughts are being read. ^
3 - Disturbing or disabling thought interruptions. Thought broadcasting.
Paranoid Delusions
1. Ideas of Persecution (CPRS - 31) - Questioning
Representing suspiciousness, exaggerated self-consciousness, the conviction of being talked 
about or watched or persecuted with malicious intent.
0 - No undue suspiciousness or self-consciousness.
1 - Vague feelings o f being observed. Occasional suspicions o f malice.
2 - Pervasive feelings o f being talked about, threatened or persecuted.
3 - Unalterable conviction o f being the victim o f systematic persecution. Delusional 
misinterpretation o f ordinary events of 'cues'. Conviction o f being referred to beyond the 
realm o f likelihood (for example on television or in newspapers).
Appendix iii.
Written Confirmation of Ethical Approval
H O S P I T A L  A U T H O R I T Y
Mr David Murphy 
Psychology Department 
Hospital
10 October 1996
Dear Mr Murphy,
I am writing to inform you that, at its. meeting on 8 October, the Ethics Committee approved 
your project entitled
’Theory of Mind in a sample of individuals with schizophrenia in a Special Hospital: its 
relationship to symptom profiles and attainment on conventional cognitive tests’
Yours sincerely
Secretary to the Ethics Committee 
cc: Dr Mary Hill
Appendix iv.
Letter Written To RMO Asking Permission To Approach Individual Patients
Dr
RMO:....................Ward November, 1996
Dear D r .....................
Re: A Study of ‘Theory of Mind’ Abilities Amongst Patients With a Clinical 
Diagnosis of Schizophrenia
As a past assistant psychologist in the Psychology Department a t ......................, I have
returned to the hospital for a clinical placement between October 1996 and March 
1997 as a part o f clinical training programme (Oxford Regional In-Service Training 
Scheme). I am hoping to carry out a research dissertation in part fulfilment.of my 
doctorate of Clinical Psychology qualification which will build on the existing 
treatment resistant schizophrenia research which has been carried out by Drs
..................... & ..........   , and would ask your, agreement to include some patients
fro m .......................ward.
The present project will examine Frith’s (1992) model of ‘Theory of Mind’ in 
schizophrenia according to differing symptom subgroups and will consider the 
performance of patients in specific tasks in relation to their attainment on 
conventional cognitive tasks.
There are.... patients o n ......................ward whom I would like to approach;
Number Name
It is anticipated that sessions will take about 30/40 minutes and that the measures will 
include;
1. A psychiatric rating checklist devised from specific items of; the Scale for the 
Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) (Andreason, 1989), the 
Comprehensive Psychiatric Rating Scale (CPRS) (Ashberg et al., 1978) and the 
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) (Overall & Gorham, 1962). This part of the 
work is carried out in consultation with D r   ..........
2. A Theoiy o f Mind test. Briefly, this is composed of six short stories devised by 
Happé (1994). After reading out each story two questions are asked. The first 
requires an interpretation o f a story character’s behaviour based on their ‘mental 
state’. The second asks for a piece o f information to be recalled which is crucial to
the comprehension o f the story, but not to the interpretation o f mental state (i.e. 
reality / memory test question).
Approval from the ......................  Ethics Committee has been obtained and
confidentiality will be maintained throughout. Each patient will also be asked for 
their written consent using the attached form. If  you have any queries regarding the 
research or would like more information, I would be happy to discuss it further. I am 
currently on a six month clinical placement and can be reached in the psychology 
department (Extension ). My research supervisor is D r .......................
Your sincerely.
Clinical Psychologist in Training
Appendix v
Written Outline & Patient Consent Form
CONSENT AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR PATIENTS
My name i s .................... I am a psychologist who has worked a t ................. in the past
and now returned as part o f my training to become a clinical psychologist. I am also 
carrying out some research to the hospital as part o f my studies and would be grateful 
for your help in this.
The purpose o f the research is to find out more about how people understand the 
thoughts and intentions o f others. New research suggests that these abilities are 
important in understanding some illnesses and in planning treatment. You will be 
read a series o f six short stories and then be asked some questions about them.
It is important to know how you feel when you do these tasks and I would also like to 
ask you some further questions about your current health and morale, using a short 
questionnaire which you have completed in the past for a colleague.
Altogether, the session should not take more than an forty minutes. Do you have any 
questions? Thank you very much for your help.
I agree to take part in this project, which has been discussed with me. My results.will 
be used anonymously for this research and will not be used in any other way unless I 
give further written consent to do this.
Signature.
